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ABSTRACT 
Technology Foresight exammes the future of the Greek economy and in 
particular what the contribution of science and technology is to this. Greek Technology 
Foresight started in October 2001 as a programme co-financed by the European Union 
and the target was to create a functional view after two decades. 
The main purpose of this project is the identification of cost-effective Aerospace 
and Defence Technologies for Greece in the year 2020. Firstly, the capacity and 
capability of Greek industries and the research environment are examined in 
conjunction with the products demanded by Armed Forces. Secondly, comes the 
examination of all relevant factors (industry, university, government) which have a 
considerable contribution to research and innovation in order to promote networking 
and further institutional development. 
Research was absolutely necessary to foresee and evaluate specific technologies 
within a frame of long-term development strategy for the various stakeholders. This 
research area is directly related to my managerial role as I have been in charge of this 
programme during its implementation. 
The research methods employed are documentary evidence, interviews and the 
Delphi approach. Thus the data collected from a variety of sources ensure the qualitative 
character of the thesis. The main findings are that the outlined Aerospace and Defence 
technologies can playa decisive role in the three different scenarios for the future of the 
country and they are related to the outcomes of science and technology evolution. 
The general conclusion is that taking into consideration Technology Foresight 
results defence procurement could be managed better which would result an efficient 
contribution to national economy, an improvement in intra-community transfer and 
several benefits from export opportunities of dual-use products. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
People in different historical periods and in different socio-economic systems 
shared at least one desire, which was to know their future in advance or even to 
influence it to their advantage. They used very different approaches and methods. from 
spiritual-religious ones to scientific investigations and various modes of planning. 
Therefore it might be claimed that the history of mankind can be written by analysing 
these different attitudes and approaches towards the future. Efforts have always been 
made to improve decision-making and public debate by thinking about longer-term 
trends and the long-term implications of short-term decisions. 
In the beginning of nineteenth century, economists stated long arguments about 
the future of capitalist economies but when the industrial revolution became solid, 
social sciences tended to become fragmented and more focused on the short term. A lot 
of developments in social and technological forecasting and then in future studies 
happened before and after the Second World War. In the 30s many of the principles of 
trend extrapolation and social indicators were established and by the 1960s, methods of 
expert analysis such as Delphi and cross-impact together with the first computer 
simulation studies started to appear. 
The so-called '"future studies", although they faced some resistance from 
traditional disciplines, seemed more holistic than the usual forecasting exercises and 
they did not attempt to predict the future. They intended to connect together various 
driving forces, trends and contemporary factors in order to envisage alternative futures. 
and were strongly influenced by new issues such as environmental problems and 
modem technologies. The first influential proponents of these future studies were the 
military and other large corporations, which were interested in strategic analysis across 
a wide variety of problems. 
Only in the late 1980s the term "'Foresight" started to be used. The success of 
some foresight exercises pushed the relative term "'Foresight" to be used for all kinds of 
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activities and nowadays the "Technology ForesighC definition is internationally 
accepted. Our world is characterized by rapid changes, which cannot be stopped at 
national borders and new technologies will always have a growing role. The worldwide 
environment is also becoming more competitive and thus competitiveness depends on 
technological, organisational and social innovation. As a result no firm can survhe this 
global competition without investing in emerging technologies and strategic research. 
which are often too risky or too expensive. Hence governments have to share this 
financial responsibility with industries and this assumption means the setting up of 
R&D priorities, resulting from a thorough strategic analysis. This comprehensive 
analysis depends on effective networking between business, academia and government. 
The essential tool towards this end is provided by Technology Foresight. 
There are three aims in this dissertation. Firstly is to locate which are the future 
key technologies in Aerospace and Defence to be developed in country up to 2020. 
Secondly is to examine the influence of human factors integration into the design and 
realization of these high-technology systems. Thirdly is to study the role of the dual-use 
technologies applied in both military and civil products (See Chapter 6.1). These aims 
include the objectives of the project as stated in the Programme Planning 
Rationale/Module DPS 4521 (Tsolakidis, 2002). Among these objectives were: 
• To propose commonality of utilised defence technologies in the three 
branches (Army, Navy, Air Force) 
• To encourage the public and private services to adopt concerns over the 
environmental protection and energy conservation 
• To diffuse findings of discussion within internal workshops in the public 
provoking social participation 
• To investigate the need for new education trends and human resources 
management 
• To identify crucial R&T requirements and examine how effective is the 
existing structure of defence research institutes. 
The Chapter 2 of this dissertation gIVes the background for the Greek 
Technology Foresight programme including the methods used for its realization. 
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Chapter 3 reviews the literature presenting all type of Foresight approaches 
(national, regional, organisational) linking them with the international economy 
evolution. 
Chapter 4 presents the Aerospace and Defence Industry in Greece examining its 
connections with European and national defence framework as well as the influence of 
technology transfer through Offset Benefits and other international cooperations. 
Scenario planning is the topic of Charter 5 and explains how the three 
hypotheses of future worlds (optimistic, conservative and pessimistic) could influence 
the state strategy in Aerospace and Defence Technologies prioritisation. 
Chapter 6 justifies how the quantitative and qualitative inductive research 
methods chosen are applied to achieve the aims of the project. Special analysis is given 
to the Delphi method which is the backbone of the Technology Foresight. 
Future technologies are covered fully in Chapter 7 and it is the outcome of 
Technology Foresight as it was required by the sponsors who were the European Union 
and the General Secretariat of Research and Technology. 
Chapter 8 focus on dual-use technologies servmg both military and civil 
purposes which are very vital for the Greek economy and national resources proper use. 
Human factors in Aerospace and Defence are presented in Chapter 9 and fill the 
gap in the design, development and operational use of high-technology systems. 
The importance of Technology Foresight exerCIses worldwide imposed the 
existence of Chapter 10 where is attempted a comparison of Greek case with other 
Technology Foresight programmes. Significant results are drawn which could lead to 
better implementation of next generation Foresight efforts either in national or in 
regional modes. 
Last but not least is Chapter 11 which refers to the general conclusions and 
recommendations. Here is also presented the leadership role of the researcher in the 
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groups of Technology Foresight participants and how the collaborative actiYities ha\e 
contributed to the project management. 
Apart from the managerial requirement of this unique effort the researcher has 
proceeded further during the preparation of this dissertation. Additional research work 
was done in implementing a third round of Delphi method, in exploring the human 
factors interface and in approaching dual-use technologies mapping them accordingly. 
Another one output of research are critical technologies with wide applications besides 
the main ones refered in Chapter 7. 
In spite of the weaknesses and shortcomings of this first generation Technology 
Foresight programme compared to other national exercises, it is our belief that this is an 
original contribution to the Greek economy and the beginning of a new culture creation 
for all stakeholders. 
1 1 
2 
THE GREEK TECHNOLOGY 
FORESIGHT 
2.1 Targets 
The subject of the Greek Technology Foresight (TF) is the examination of the 
future of the Greek economy and especially the role of science, technology and research 
in shaping this future. As time horizons for this examination the years 2015 and 2021 
have been set, while the target is to establish a framework of effective orientation which 
will assist the government in the preparation of long-term policy and enterprises for 
better strategy planning. Within the final aims of the project the foundation of a center 
for know-how absorption is also included and applications of TF in order to further 
continue this activity in country. 
TF is not an exercise to forecast the future or a study for national development 
or any kind of strategic plan analysis but just a tool to define the critical factors, the 
drivers, the continuities/discontinuities as well as the opportunities/challenges of Greek 
society always related to the existing obstacles and taking into account that science, 
technology and innovation consist of one of the main feeders of economic and social 
evolution (TF Contract, 2001). The main research focus of this thesis is to locate 
specific Aerospace and Defence Technologies which will playa key role in Greek 
economy and development. 
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2.2 Characteristics 
The three characteristics of the process in the Greek IF remam the 
specialization, the creativity and the interaction. The triangle in Figure 1 represents the 
process including the various methods and planning techniques for decision making. 
These characteristics are necessary for the successfulness of TF (Van der Meulen, 
1999). First of all is specialization which connects the possible future with current 
technologies, then creativity which doubts the rooted constraints and interests, while 
lastly remains interaction to prepare a common vision for the future by combining the 
ideas and beliefs of individuals with estimations and anticipations in various domains. 
Lack of balance between these elements could offer poor final benefits because if 
specialization prevails then it will tend to reproduce itself or creativity alone will create 
only science fiction scenarios or the interaction without a certain target will be a simple 
loss of time. As it seems in Figure 1 the presented technologies inside the triangle can 
be advantageous only if such equilibrium exists (ibid). 
CREATIVITY 
Science Fiction 
Brain Storming 
Studies/Reports Working Groups 
Scenarios 
Delphi 
Conferences 
Combination 
of Methods 
Perspectives 
Matrix of 
Concequences 
Workshops 
SPECIALIZATION INTERACTION 
Figure 1. Balance of Specialization, Creativity and Interaction benefits TF 
results. 
1 ~ 
The TF programme is co-financed by the European Union and the Greek 
government while the contract was signed on October 19. 2001 between General 
Secretariat of Research and Technology (Ministry of Development) and a consortium 
consisted of the National Technical University, the Economic University of Athens, 
National School of Public Health and two private companies, Logotech and K-:..iet. The 
total budget reached 1.182.685 Euros and programme duration was originally 30 
months. However, an extension of 15 months was awarded and the project was 
completed on March 21, 2005. Moreover the amount paid is 20 per cent less than the 
agreed contractually because of delivered material shortfalls according to the final 
evaluation of the newly elected government. 
2.3 Methods 
2.3.1 Working Groups and Horizontal Actions 
The first Greek TF has used a combination of methods and has emphasized in 
an exchange of opinions, dialogues and interactive approach since it has not been 
limited only to technologies but also covered critical issues (i.e. Health) or vital 
branches (i.e. Tourism) 1. 
The Working Groups undertook the responsibility for shaping the scenarios at 
the level of thematic domains. They consisted of entrepreneurs, academicians, 
researchers, representatives of professional bodies, governmental officials etc .. 
according to the subject area of each group. The Working Group members selected a 
Chairman, who presided over the organised meetings and workshops2. The Rapporteur 
of the Working Group was the key-person for the function of the group and had the 
responsibility for preparing the essays and organising the workshops. The selection of 
I Actually. ten years ago, the General Secretariat for Research and Technology (GSRT) funded on initial 
effort of eleven TF exercises for corresponding different application fields. These independent 
experiences could be considered as the predecessors of the present TF which is the first real ~F process in 
country since early ones lacked the element of interconnection and interaction which strong.l: 
characterises the current case. 
2 The WG Rapporteurs were appointed by the Steering Committee ( with the GSR 1's consent) and \\ ere 
responsible for preparing the essays. 
1-+ 
Working Group members was done through an invitation of public interest issued by the 
General Secretariat of Research and Technology in cooperation with the Steering 
Committee. 
In total the following eleven thematic Working Groups were formulated with 
between 10 to 15 members each 
o Agricultural and Fishing Development 
o Tourism - Civilization 
o Energy 
o Transportation 
o Governance and e-government 
o Industrial Production 
o Environment 
o Biotechnology 
o Health and Quality of life 
o Information, Communication and e-business 
o New Materials 
Each Working Group was assisted by another broader Support Group, which 
consisted of representatives coming from various agencies, social groups, professional 
unions and other prestigious personalities of the specific working environment. The first 
selection of the Support Group members was drawn from the list of individuals gathered 
after the first call of interest. These people have formed the first target group for the 
systematic communication and dispersion of ideas. They have been receiving on a 
continuous basis the results of the meetings, copies of the interim reports, newsletters, 
information bulletins and all documents produced by the Working Group. Additionally 
the Working Groups and the Support Groups were complemented by a broader team, 
the Groups of Commentators. These members were all those who had replied positively 
to the initial call of interest but practically they were not able to participate either in the 
respective Working Group or in the Support Group. Later on the Groups of 
Commentators have also joined every participant in the open discussion of partial TF 
analyses. 
1 ~ 
TF programme has also included five Horizontal Actions. These actions aimed 
in helping the Working Groups to develop their activities according to the international 
state-of-the-art in the fields of Society and TF, Human Resources Training and 
Development, Space and Regional Character, Innovation and Investments. The principal 
interface among the Working Groups, the Horizontal Actions and the Steering 
Committee was during the preparation of TF documents. As a first interface can be 
considered the Start Text which included guidelines and directives while the second 
interface was the Main Report which aimed in displaying all the significant terms and 
conditions for the evolution of sciences and technologies in Greece up to 2021 3. The 
Figure 2 gives an idea of the interactions developed between involved parties (see page 
18). 
2.3.2 Scenarios Development 
The creation of scenanos based on data elaboration, documentation 
exploration, public discussion and test of methods - was a tool to investigate the future 
(Chermack et aI, 2001). Through scenarios the shaping of possible worlds is permitted 
where specific activities and social partners are defined. The basic assumption for this 
remains that only free creative imagination could catch this future environment for the 
year 2021 and the triptych of research/science/technology is simultaneously the field, 
the source and the variable which outline the picture of the 2021 environment. 
There are two basic known working modes to produce scenarios (Ringland, 
1998). The former assumes an analytical approach and many studies together with a 
vast experience in forecasting and strategic analyses. The second is based on the 
building of a mosaic of events, which in any case are properly documented. The Greek 
effort was mainly established on the second pattern but there were some cases where the 
first pattern was used (i.e. scenarios for Energy and Materials). Scenarios are of a hybrid 
character composed of elements of scientific speech and narration because they are at 
the same time a discourse and a fiction (Aligica, 2005). Due to the TF programme 
complexity and broadness it was necessary to prepare scenarios at both a macro-le\eJ 
(the whole TF project) and at a micro-level (the thematic areas) (TF Synthesis Report. 
2004). 
:1 More information can be found in the TF project website (\\\\\\.foresight-gsrt.gr) 
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At a macro-level, the Steering Committee prepared some scenarios initially 
which were further processed with the Chairmen of the twelve Working Groups and the 
responsible Coordinators of the five Horizontal Actions. This top-down technique has 
permitted scenarios to be presented, which were exposed to the criticism of Working 
Group members and other selected commentators. Then one particular day in January 
2003 was devoted to the elaboration of scenarios. The results of this generalized 
bottom-up debate were analyzed and evaluated by the Steering Committee operating as 
the final arbitrator for the definite shape of the macro-scenarios. The international 
bibliography has also provided enough material to support the scenarios for Europe 
(OECD, 2001). 
At a micro-level, the analysis focused on twelve thematic areas corresponding 
to different domains and technologies. At this level it was necessary to develop detailed 
and specialized micro-scenarios, which examined the strategic planning and policies for 
the development of science, technology and innovation for easy thematic domains. At 
the same time, these micro-scenarios control the possibility of macro-scenarios 
realization as well as probable alternative future works, based on progress in certain 
areas. 
It must be noted here that scenarios create ideal situations, which are controlled 
principally by the completeness, the cohesion and the interconnectivity of their data. 
Above all they are logic constructions, allowing the location of topics, problems and 
chances, which must be given special attention and care. Scenarios do not describe nor 
they foresee future situations (Gregory and Duran. 2001). As a matter of fact, the future 
will be a special mixture of the scenarios, therefore this analysis of problems and 
challenges was considered one of the main feeding inputs during the preparation of 
micro-scenarios by the Working Groups in parallel with the four basic TF macro-
scenarIOS. 
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2.4 Initial Plans Amendment 
The initial declaration of TF project for the 11 thematic domains has been 
modified by the Steering Committee in some aspects, for example. the separation of 
Tourism from Civilization and the addition of a Special Working Group (May 2003) for 
Defence Technologies. The focus of this last group was broader in relation to the other 
Working Groups. Their aim was double; to register the trends and the perspectives of 
the local defence industry but also to examine its possible incorporation into the 
European defence conglomerate in parallel with the Greek participation into the 
common European Policy for Defence and Security. 
For this reason the members of the Defence Technologies Working Group were 
originated from 
a) Political Analysts and Economists who analyzed issues influencing the 
long-term planning of the country and 
b) Engineers and Scientists of the public and private defence who were 
concentrated in describing the key-technologies and the micro-scenarios 
for the future of Greek defence industries. 
This new Working Group has followed a different time frame but the 
respective report was delivered properly within the deadline set for the whole TF~. 
The same logic for researching new and more functional ways/schemes of 
work has driven the Steering Committee to restructure the Working Group of 
Governance and e-Govemment. The original complex character of the vague field of 
this group in conjunction with the permanent practical difficulties for most of the 
members forced the Steering Committee to replace the Chairman and the Rapporteur of 
this team as well as to activate new members from the relative Support Group. thus , 
achieving the early delivery of their final reports. 
4 The Steering Committee set some guidelines for the WG and SG members selection process. 
emphasizing the need to have representatives of different schools of thought in a given field. the balance 
between age groups, genders and those from the capital and other parts. of the cou.ntry. _ Although no 
rigorous statistical analysis has been conducted to describe the panels. yet It can be saId sate Iy that these 
guidelines were only partially respected by us. 
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International Experience 
Transfer Group 
IntI 
Experience 
Advisor 
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Control 
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Technical 
Support Unit 
< > 
< > 
Informati-
onal 
System 
Figure 2. Interactions of groups involved in the Greek Technology Foresight 
process 
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The progress of the Working Groups in supporting the first working texts has 
shown the problem of homogeneity of these reports concerning their appearance and 
quality because they had to be equivalent and complementary to each other leading to 
the final modulation of a total synthetic document. This is the reason why a special 
conference was organized (June 2003) in order to present and discuss the interim 
results of all Working Groups and Horizontal Actions of TF. During this conference 
Dr.T.Kuwahara - Director of Japan's Science and Technology Foresight Center and of 
National Institute of Science and Technology Policy - has presented the Japanese 
experience on five consecutive TF programmes carried out over the last 30 years, which 
makes it the oldest in the world. 
As a follow-up to this conference was the organization (end of July 2003) of an 
ad hoc meeting of all Chairmen and Rapporteurs. During this large meeting the Steering 
Committee commented on every first text, critising the structure and the format of these 
reports in order to assure a common appearance of the global Synthesis Report. 
2.5 Technology Foresight Implementation 
The dissemination and diffusion of TF results to the broader public were 
completed in a period of four months in five different Greek cities. Every such 
conference had a specific main discussion topic and invited lecturers to develop current 
issues of national or even international interest related to the thematic areas of TF. 
Naturally the results of the various Working Groups were also presented in connection 
with the Horizontal Actions. 
This long effort started from Athens (November 19, 2004) presenting systems 
and policies for the global learning economy focusing on regional development of 
innovation and knowledge flows. Then we moved to Thessaloniki (December 13. 2004) 
covering the issue of governance in economy and society including human resources 
management and development. The third meeting was in Heraklion, Creta (February 1 7. 
2005) under the title of sustainable development where biotechnology. renewable 
energy resources and touristic activities with respect to the environment \\cre examined. 
Patras in Peloponnese (February 22, 2005) hosted the next public conference exploring 
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the question of innovation support through the studies of potential foreign inyestments. 
boost of research opportunities of technology parks with as a main objectiye Greek 
competitivity in Europe and other continents. The fourth event occurred in the city of 
Volos, Thessalia (March 1, 2005) where the two Working Groups of Aerospace and 
Defence Technologies, Agricultural! Fishing Development and Industrial Production 
have presented their findings. The subject of the conference was to find the challenges 
and chances for regional industrial and agricultural evolution. The final and closing 
meeting was again carried out in Athens (March 5. 2005) focusing on the science and 
technology policy of Greece in 2021, while in parallel the Working Groups of New 
Materials and Human Resources Development had the opportunity to disseminate the 
results of their reports. 
Up to the end of March, 2005 the mobility of Greek TF was very dynamic. The 
Table 1 below summarizes some characteristic indicators presenting the interests 
shown. 
• 780 Applications of Experts 
• 250 Members of Working Groups 
• 400 Members of Support Groups 
• 220 Commentators 
• 65 Meetings of Working Groups 
• 25 Consultation Meetings 
• 15 Additional Events (Conferences, Workshops, Fora etc.) 
• 2200 Participants in Consultation Meetings 
• 165 Experts participated in Panels 
• 231.000 visits in TF web site 
• 2.100 Pages of 19 Reports 
Table 1. Indicators for the Greek Technology Foresight exercise 
3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
Before attempting an analysis of the Foresight phenomenon it would be useful 
to identify its definition, which will help to follow the process of it and also to find its 
main elements. 
2001). 
A recent definition was given by the STRATA-ETAN Expert Group (EU/DG, 
"An important tool in the development and management of future-oriented 
innovation systems, based within a wider context of future-oriented 
coordination activities in a society. It could be defined as a purposefully 
organized process bringing together expectations of diverse actors about 
possible development paths to formulate strategic views about the future that 
take into account broad social and economic developments. " 
From similar sources (EU/FOREN, 2001) comes a rather complementary 
definition as: 
"A systematic, participatory, future-intelligence-gathering and medium-long-
term vision-building process aimed at present day decisions and mobilizing 
joint actions. Foresight arises from a convergence of trends underlying 
recent developments in the fields of policy analysis, strategic planning and 
future studies. It brings together ke}' agents of change and various sources of 
knowledge in order to develop strategic vision and anticipatory 
intelligence ", 
Moreover the stronger definition, according to the English dictionary. Foresight is: 
"Regard or provision for the future ". 
More specifically there are definitions for Technology Foresight. Slaughter 
(1998) supports that TF in an organization is 
"The ability to create and maintain a high-quality, coherent and functional 
forward view and to use the insights arising in organizationally useful wars, 
for example, to detect adverse conditions, guide policy. and share strategy 
and to explore new markets products and services. " 
Within the tradition of policy-making at governmental level Martin (1995) 
defines TF as: 
"The process involved in systematically attempting to look into the longer-
term future of science, technology, the economy and society "with the aim of 
identifying the areas of strategic research and the emerging genetic 
technologies likely to yield the greatest economic and social benefits. " 
To interpret these definitions we should examine the wider scenario to which 
they belong. European Union member states have been following the "Lisbon Strategy" 
(established during the European council in Lisbon, March 23-24, 2000) for a common 
vision of the socio-economic development of Europe. The objective of this strategy is to 
render the European Union by 2010 "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth It'ith more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion" (FOREN. 2001). To achieve this, Foresight 
and policies for research and innovation are essential mechanisms within the broad 
context of political interventions on the socio-economic level. 
In an organizational concept Foresight has been considered as the ability to 
foresee events before they happen, providing thus the capability to anticipate the future 
(D ' Aveni, 1994). This has led to many forms of Foresight: national. regional and 
organizationaL which will be examined later on. 
Returning to the previous definitions some considerations can be dra\\"n on 
which European approach to Foresight is based. Firstly. Foresight emerged from 
building on the past, thinking of the present and looking into the future. Therefore it 
attempts to predict the future not simply by extrapolating the past - like forecasting _ 
but it tries to design an orientation by managing uncertainties and ambiguities. This 
implies that, in spite of casual events, people's role is the central point of efforts for the 
construction of their own future. Human action is not but a sum of actors such as power 
levels, requirements, perspectives and general interests, which inevitably dri\'e the need 
for a strategic and parallel vision of the risks and problems together with opportunities. 
Finally, we are dealing with a holistic approach because there is a simultaneous 
interaction between not only technological but also social, economic, political and 
cultural parameters. 
In the rest of this Chapter the concept of Foresight and its applications to 
national, regional and organizational context with the associated transverse 
characteristics and objectives will be presented. The comparison of Greek TF with other 
countries' Foresight exercises in Chapter 7 will present a practical application of this 
theoretical analysis. 
3.2 Evolution of the international economy and 
Foresight 
The transformations of economy. both in macro- and micro-level have been 
radical during the last 30 years whilst the activities of Foresight developed. The 
relatively stable national or international markets. based mainly on physical resources. 
have given their position to new dynamic and highly competiti\'e local and global 
markets depending on intangible assets and principally on knowledge in processes of 
creation of value (Dunning, 1997). The transition from hierarchical to flexible 
capitalism has been encouraged by certain factors such as (Romano. 2002) 
o 
o 
Complexity and specialization of acti\'ities 
Interdependence of many markets 
o Increasing rationalization and extension of actions of business units 
o New organizational culture and behavior 
o New institutions and enterprises fonns 
o Innovation-driven economy and amazing diffusion of infonnation 
technology 
As these were the characteristics of the macro-economy at the micro-economic 
level, the respective gradual passage from hierarchical organizational structures 
happened to network knowledge-based organizational fonns. Actually, during the 
1980s, the competition amongst companies was the important element in a market-
oriented view. The next decade, the 1990s, was characterized from more knowledge 
than assets-based focus. Higher value of the intangible resources (know-how, skills. 
total quality management etc.) prevailed over tangible assets and analysis of sectors 
(Liu et aI, 2002). 
The knowledge-based economy emerged favoring the transition towards 
flexible production and inter-organizational co-evolution systems (Schwartz et aL 
1999). It was unavoidable because innovation was connected with the introduction of 
digital technologies forming the infonnation technology society based on network 
organizational structures. These type of structures are more suitable to the dynamism 
and complexity of the new competition strategy, influenced heavily by uncertainty and 
rapid changes. 
All these changes have strongly influenced the evolution and application of 
Foresight. The concurrent "resources based" approach of business strategy model is the 
integration of entrepreneurship and strategic management that's why some analysts call 
it strategic entrepreneurship. In mathematical language, it is the transition from 
interpretative models of a Newtonian detenninistic nature to new dynamic-non-linear 
models. These realistic models are open systems to the external environment hence 
unstable, troubled, irreversible and path-dependent (Cariola and Rolfo, 2004). Since the 
final state is unpredictable and as complex evolutionary systems tend to explore only 
possible futures that is the reason why Foresight is important in these cases. 
The creation of F oresight (or sometimes insight) models \\3S encouraged 
taking into account local and global aspects. rapid and continual changes as \\"ell non-
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linear approaches. Strategic thought shifted from objective to a more subjectivt: view of 
reality and from linear cause-effect relationship (technology forecasting) to methods of 
influencing the emergent phenomenon (technology foresight). Thus decision-making 
processes are regulated by multi-parameter dynamic competitive context where other 
correlated objectives such as growth, development of knowledge, traditional local 
advantages and cultural characteristics co-exist (Banders, 1998). 
3.3 Foresight Diffusion 
In light of the above described economic evolution and theoretical aspects 
since the 1980s, governments have subsequently paid increasing attention to Foresight 
both at a national and at a regional level. So far, more than 30 countries have completed 
Foresight programmes of every kind with very encouraging results (Miles, 2003). These 
exercises aimed at identifying emerging trends, technologies or possible futures and 
their classification below as either regional, organizational or national explains why the 
expanding Foresight culture is considered as a new tool for strategic decision making. 
3.3.1 Regional Foresight 
Despite the domination of the globalized world, there is an increasing 
consensus that the regions are often the most significant place for the improvement of 
economic performance. This occurs through routines that are still connected with 
regional and local institutions and with socio-territorial contexts (Aydalot, 1998). 
Regional Foresight exercises are a critical tool for local authorities to identify 
their strengths and potential as well as to prepare plans to build on these \\ith the aid of 
scenarios. The success of Foresight projects depends heavily on the full invoh'ement of 
the relevant actors (citizens, industries, authorities, educational units etc.). At regional 
level this is much more manageable because of the smaller numbers of people invoh"ed 
and also because they have more reference points in common. Physical proximity and 
local familiarity still playa major role, while global and international competiti\~ness 
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depend more and more on development of regional strengths and particularities 
(STRATA-ETAN Report, 2002). 
The recent tum in the regional dimension of development does not concern 
only an accumulation of economic activities but principally the communities of interests 
capable of expressing synergies and relations among different actors (Ohmae. 1995). 
The European Union, as a supra-national institution, among its policies has established 
the European Research Area (ERA) by reinforcing and widening European unity 
through co-ordination of initiatives in diverse regions and by strengthening regional 
development in all member states. By improving learning and collaboration on regional 
Foresight across the ERA, they contribute to the creation of a pool of knowledge on 
European Foresight activities, combining the potential of each region with a wide and 
competent network of institutions all over the European continent (Keenan and Uyarra, 
2002). On the other hand, faced with competitive pressure from other countries (i.e. low 
labor costs) regional industries are trying to find an independent path where 
globalization cannot be avoided. 
Regional Innovation System (RIS) - in comparison with National Innovation 
System (NIS) - are not many and nor they are powerful, so local authorities try to 
establish optimal conditions for their activation and the innovative transformation of 
respective districts (HLEG, 2002). 
The problems and challenges in implementing regional Foresight are classified 
III three categories: conceptual, methodological and procedural. However the four 
significant experiences of regional Foresight in Europe, Lombardy (Italy), West 
Middlands (UK), Grand Lyon (France) and Catalonia (Spain) are considered 
satisfactory (Appendix 8). Greece has already prepared a regional Foresight in West 
Makedonia and now they issued the public bid for Ionian Islands. 
3.3.2 Organizational Foresight 
Organizations in their efforts to cope with the future they haye been follo\\ing 
the concept of organizational Foresight which shows three main characteristics. 
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Firstly is the key element of time (Blackman, 2004 and Brown. 1997) in the 
development of Foresight, which enables organizations to anticipate what \\-ill happen 
and prepare possible future scenarios. Secondly, Foresight is connected with the process 
of organizational learning (Havel, 1994, Hejden, 2004). In this case. managers playa 
pivotal role because they scan the environment by collecting relevant information from 
different sources (Cohen, 1990), which may include customers. competitors, suppliers 
and others. This scanning is either passive (Higgins, 1987. Fiske.1991) or acti \'e 
(Argyris, 1996, Van Lehn, 1993). One confirms the existing situation with some 
adjustments and the other chooses to change activities by abandoning old ones (March, 
1991). The whole procedure for the determination and implementation of their future 
actions - by using their cognitive schemata to interpret and evaluate the resulting probes 
of this research - enhances the process of organizational learning (Daft, 1994). 
Therefore Foresight seems to pivot around a cycle of environmental scanning, 
interpretation and consequent learning. The third characteristic of Foresight for business 
units is the directed process (Slaughter, 1996). Looking carefully for possible futures 
the firms' boundaries are broadened and through the methodical process they can avoid 
potential problems and crises before they occur, plan proactively by evaluating the 
implications of future events and strengthen their envision capabilities. 
The modem strategy development (McMaster, 1996) is based on Foresight 
tools for prediction and planning. These tools include brainstorming, econometrical 
forecasting and worst-case scenarios against disasters (Mendonca et aI, 2004). The 
methods of scenario planning is widely adopted in the industry either as exploratory 
(based on past and present trend) or anticipative (based on different visions of the 
future) (Godet and Roubelat, 1996). 
Attention has been given recently to usmg Foresight in the product 
development and technology field. While traditional forecasting methods have been 
accused of being responsible for many failures of new technology products - since 
technology is not the only driver in the market (Carlson, 2004) - Technology Foresight 
is very much appreciated. The principal reason is its relation to the processes. which 
take into account the R&D department proposals for innovation and combine them \\ith 
the users opinions (Anderson, 1997). Similarly a set of probing processes allow 
organizations to balance the rigidity of business plans and the real chaos of future trends 
because otherwise they will lose their focus in product de\'elopment (Constanzo. 2()()~). 
The significance of probes is well acknowledged (ibid) by innoyation 
enterprises when they desire to highlight possible development ayenues. Direct probt:s 
(hands-on experience) pertain to experimental procedures for new workers and data 
collection is realised through alliances with other firms and use of customers' opinions. 
Indirect probes are done through internal meetings complemented with the parallel 
employment of futurists groups. 
However, the probing process is never an end goal but Foresight emerges 
continuously so companies' visions and strategies are developed or rejected through the 
perpetual probing and learning process (Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2005). 
3.3.3 National Foresight 
The drivers for conducting Foresight activities by many nations seem very 
common. Japan, which started 30 years earlier, had applied the policy to move away 
from imported technologies trying to develop local capabilities. The same happened 
recently in Austria where innovative technologies developed in-country were 
considered more necessary. Germany, after unification, desired to find efficient ways to 
finance research programmes in their FUTUR Foresight because of the imposed budget 
constraints. Similar financial limitations drive the UK programme asking for better co-
ordination of the national R&D efforts. Hungary and the Czesh Republic facing a 
transition to a market economy, have applied Foresight to study and t:xperience new 
approaches to innovation policies. France has located 100 key technologies for framing 
expenses and has focused them on specific areas. Greece the youngest member of the 
Foresight Club completed its efforts to locate domains for development in the national 
Technology Foresight programme for better value of money three months ago (TF \\t:b 
site, 2005). 
To sum up, the main target of national Foresight exercises appears to be the 
desire to establish a new policy tool for the future policy challenges. Keenan (2001 ) 
summarizes these challenges as follows 
• Policymakers are putting SCIence and technology (S&T) priorities 111 
relation to restricted budgets and growing international competition 
• 
• 
• 
The interest to create new networks and strengthen eXIstmg ones _ 
particularly between the S &T base and business - has forced us to liYe 
in a "network society" and to innovate in a "nenvork economy" 
Foresight helps in creating shared strategic visions because companies 
are required to manage interfaces with cooperators, regulators, customers 
and suppliers 
The arrival of the 21 st century and the so-called "Millennium Effect" has 
favored futures-type studies since government seemed to be preparing 
for new opportunities 
Foresight exercises emphasizing on processes assisted in the emergence 
of a new more inclusive style of policy-making during the last decade of 
the past century. Moreover the public sector became less dominant and 
has permitted the wider engagement of business and civil society III 
decision making for policy matters. 
These challenges tend to feed into the general objectives of Foresight exercises, 
which must have credibility, legitimacy and authority in order to be accepted by the 
target audience (Tamsin et aI, 2001). Almost all national Foresight programmes include 
the three main specific objectives stated below. 
The first objective is to provide guidelines for the prioritization of science, 
technology and innovation plans. Recommendations for industrial innovation according 
to in-country abilities must be coupled with future trends or forces whether these be 
market or S&T driven. The next objective is to mainly encourage business units to 
apply long-term strategic approaches and to flexibly respond to changes according to 
their SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats). One instrument of 
Foresight for this is the preparation of possible scenarios. The third and last objective is 
to improve collaboration and strong partnerships for better-wired innovation schemes 
between the triple helix: government, business and science base. 
Since most exerCIses are sponsored by SCIence and technology ministries. 
Foresight objectives are primarily concerned with S&T issues. Ho\\evcr it is not 
uncommon that the results of Foresight include non - S&T recommendations. 
Every national Foresight programme can include specific objectiyes other than 
the above stated ones: for example Hungary view it as supporting their entrance to the 
European Union and Spain expected to be helped through Foresight to haye better 
access to and presence across European research programmes and institutions. 
Alternatively Sweden and The Netherlands broadened the scope of their national 
projects by inserting more socially oriented objectives and the second round of the UK 
Foresight effort was more problem-oriented than market-driven (Keenan, 2001 and 
Rappert, 1999). The perception is that Foresight activities are widely accepted and 
appreciated and are becoming more sophisticated in their efforts to achie\'e better results 
for users. 
4 
AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE 
INDUSTRY 
4.1 Globalization of Economy 
The decade of 1990s was the critical period when Technology Foresight (TF) 
became widespread. Before 1990 some few efforts started in The United States. 
Germany and The United Kingdom while Japan and France have been engaging since 
1970 and 1980 respectively. Around 1990 other countries followed: Netherlands, 
Australia, Austria and Hungary (NISTEP, 2001). The main drivers of change, which 
forced the interest in Technology Foresight, was competition, scientific competencies 
and the complexity and constraints on public budgets (Martin, 2003). 
Starting from competition its seems that economic antagonism brought immense 
variations in labor cost which led companies to shift resources and production without 
difficulty from country to country in order to obtain corresponding advantages. The 
more industrialized countries however apply continuous innovations and use emerging 
technologies to enhance competitiveness. As long as investments are required for these 
efforts, they must share the financial responsibility with industries since the latter do not 
desire to undertake the whole risk. On the other hand, a number of social factors 
(unemployment, inequality, environmental sustainability) came to balance the 
continuous trend for higher productivity so Technology Foresight was considered the 
new policy tool to achieve this equilibrium (Georghiou, 2004). 
Similarly another balance has been experienced in national budgets because of a 
considerable number of reasons. Amongst these there are the increasing costs of 
healthcare and social welfare due to an ageing population. the funds for education while 
the limitations for tax-raising and other regulations for EU member states constrain state 
income. Therefore the greater accountability for g<.wernmental spending imposes better 
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justification of funds for research and technology where selectivity and priority remain 
key factors. Here again Technology Foresight can help substantially (ibid). 
Complexity of systems is also inevitable, since coupling and interaction are 
growing among public and private responsibilities, locaL national and global concerns 
as well as politics and cultures. Technologies either fused or not (Kodama, 1992) 
together with the various sources, which produce knowledge still form a synthetic group 
of issues adding to the general complexity. The approach to confront these interrelations 
is first of all to understand these systems then to create better collaboration schemes and 
finally to use flexible ways and links for effective outputs. Technology Foresight is a 
good way to prepare these internal and external operations. 
Scientific and technological competencies are significant to make our lives 
better and creating skills necessary for every kind of cooperation and knowledge 
exchange. As skills inevitably became obsolete new ones arise and that is why written 
or oral knowledge must be transfered. This transfer is generally not easy and appropriate 
connections among people must be established; Technology Foresight again assures 
proper ways of communications (Menendez and Cabello, 2001). 
4.2 European Defence 
The Hellenic Government is aligned with the European Defence policy. which is 
moving towards the improvement of Europe's capability to react in periods of various 
crises, apart from those caused by terrorism. 
Of course, first of alL Greek national military forces have a primary role to 
defend Greece against any external enemy. In addition to these national efforts and our 
participation to NATO, Greece must enhance EU Common Foreign and Security Polic~ 
(CFSP). According to this CFSP European nations can react to any kind of crises by 
supplying civilian and humanitarian assistance or even providing military support if 
needed5. 
5 A . I II" of the 1957 Treaty of Rome excludes defence from ECs joint responsibilities ("An~ 
rtlC e ---'. . . d' 
M b State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the production ot or tra e In arms. em er "" 
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Up to now European states have depended heavily on the enited States In 
dealing with crises around or sometimes within Europe. Hence there is a need to 
improve European military capabilities without any tendency to compete but to 
complement and strengthen NATO forces. These improvements either in the short or in 
the long term are connected to defence reviews, which must be conducted by European 
nations towards the deployment of modern and flexible Armed Forces. 
The Maastricht Treaty came into force in November 1993 introducing amongst 
others the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. This is a yery 
important agreement aiming to protect common values and common interests by 
reinforcing EU security levels, safeguarding peace and global feelings of assurance 
through the promotion of international cooperation and democratic principles as they 
are defined by justice and respect for human rights and freedoms. 
The same treaty also foresees "the eventual framing of a common defence 
policy, which might in time lead to a common defence". However the Western 
European Union (WEU), although existing for fifty years and been responsible for the 
implementations of ESDP decision for defence matters, is under suspension because it 
was proved ineffective, especially during crisis in Kosovo. The EU nations admitted 
that effective crisis management is based upon the combination of diplomatic, 
economic, civilian and military efforts. Therefore the military shortfalls of the EU will 
be covered by CFSP and this framework is continuously stressed during the various 
European Councils. Additionally, European nations, which are not part of the EU can be 
involved in European Defence as well as in other civilian aspects of crisis management. 
The management process remains a complex issue since the respective missions belong 
to a wide spectrum as they are described in Petersberg tasks below. The necessary 
coordination has to take also into account the national programmes of Member States 
and the NATO initiatives (Papantoniou, 2003). 
The EU Headline Goal towards this purpose covers the deployment capability of 
60,000 troops within two months and to sustain them up to one year accompanied by 
additional air and naval units. This force by no means could be characterized as a 
European Army or a Rapid Reaction Force. It is simply a pool of capabilities from 
't' ns and war materials; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the 
mum 10 , 'I' " 
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on market regarding products which are not intended for speCIfically ml Ita!) purposes ), 
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which necessary groups can be assembled quickly to confront particular operations 
always with the approval of national governments. These operations are defined in the 
following Petersberg Tasks: 
"Humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis 
management including peacemaking. At one end of the spectrum an 
operation could be dealing with the evacuation of people from an area and 
providing security and assistance to humanitarian organi=ations in order to 
help restore order and to allow the relevant organizations to provide relief to 
refugees. The definition also covers "conflict prevention" where a force may 
help to prevent a potential conflict situation from escalating ill order to 
create conditions where the conflict can be peacefully resolved. Fillaf~r. at 
the more military demanding end of the spectrum, an operation could help to 
resolve a crisis between two warringfactions" (1999). 
It is meant that those units covering EU led missions must be in a high readiness 
and well-equipped with modem equipment meeting criteria of interoperability. 
sustainability and deployment ability. This multinational cooperation brings many 
benefits such as increased cost-effectiveness because of the resources pools between 
countries and enhanced overall military capability. Moreover smaller nations are 
allowed to contribute to large-scale operations, which could be sustained otherwise by 
individual countries. 
This effort will also strengthen NATO by usmg the existing operational 
capabilities of the Alliance in varied circumstances, which remains the only 
organization for collective defence in Europe. The transparency between EU and NATO 
will have the additional advantage of avoiding duplication of capabilities and structures 
but on the contrary increases cost-effectiveness through the interoperability and 
complement of missions. The whole strategic direction is carried out by the Political 
and Security Council, assisted by EU Military Committee and EU Military Staff which 
have the necessary expertise for the operations. 
In conclusion, Common European defence pertains to the previously mentioned 
approaches to face prevention and management of conflicts where\\.?r they arise. 
However military power is only one aspect of the overall subject of security and crisis 
management in the 21 5t century. The EU possesses other ci\'ilian means (such as 
sanctions, external assistance, trade control, migration policy measures and 
transnational justice rules) to exercise pressure whenever needed and in general uses 
these resources and skills before any military actions. 
4.3 Hellenic Aerospace and Defence Industry 
Many countries spend considerable resources on procurement, maintenance 
and training of their Armed Forces in order to deter a military engagement and, if 
necessary, be ready for a possible attack against them. Major wars have some 
characteristics like rareness, unpredictable timing and uncontrollable variability over 
time and geographical coordinates. Moreover opposing forces may use technologies and 
weapons quite different. Consequently it is not easy at all to calculate the benefits of 
national defence expenses of a particular country like Greece, especially in peacetime. 
The main governmental aim is to decrease defence expenditure and direct these funds to 
other urgent social needs; but without investing substantially during many years on 
defence you are not adequately prepared against any external threat. 
Internationally, military production capability has had a slight reduction. 
therefore the respective export markets have become very competitive. Western Europe 
and the USA governments were obliged to intervene in the defence market and 
subsidize development costs, thus protecting their domestic manufacturers of military 
and paramilitary equipment. All these happened in spite of the necessary processes to 
do with the privatisation and consolidation of the defence industry leading to the 
creation of a few immense defence firms, which offer their products firstly in their 
national armies (Dundervill et aI, 1999). 
Although after the end of cold war the military budget fell dramatically. the 
Greek Armed Forces spend a lot of money (30% growth during the year 1989-2001) to 
protect themselves from any Turkish aggression. In general Greece' s defence budget is 
classified as one of the highest in NATO and EU organisations. The fact that Greece is 
classified as the seventh larger importer of major conventional \\eapons worldwide is 
depressing (SIPRI, 2001)6. Thus, in view of the above mentioned there are efforts to 
reduce dependence on foreign monopolies by developing a local industrial complex of 
state or private companies. Currently this complex consists of 85 firms with an annual 
turnover of more than € 1.5 billion and employing around 17,000 people. Nevertheless 
the military equipment produced domestically covers only a certain part of national 
demands such as ammunition, ground vehicles, explosives, portable weapons and 
maintenance services for aircraft and helicopters. Hence technologically advanced 
weapon systems (submarines, airplanes, helicopters, airborne or surface missiles. radars 
armored vehicles etc.) are imported from western (USA, France, UK, Germany) or even 
eastern countries (Russia, Ukraine, Slovakia, Yugoslavia, Armenia) (Economicos 
Tachydromos, 1999). 
Apart from the obvious target of strengthening the Greek Armed Forces one 
of the main aims was to improve the participation in terms of Greek added value to the 
local defence industry in the various procurement programs. In 1996, when the 
realization of the first Joint Medium Term Armament Programme (JMAP) started. the 
involvement of the Greek defence industry in the military purchases was around 4% of 
the total contracts value. Then JMAP aimed to improve this share to 15% and now the 
government promises a further increase to 40%. This is not feasible because of the 
relatively weak industrial infrastructure of the defence industries and the limited 
technological abilities (Bartzokas, 1992). The motive for this policy is threefold: to 
cover the strategic, the political and the economic aspects (Brauer, 2002) but the 
resulted 3.7% of Greek participation in this first JMAP proves that the set target was 
ambitious. 
The effort for the development of indigenous arms production started in the 
mid-1970s. The only achievements of local industry before this period where the Greek 
Powder and Cartridge Company (PYRKAL) and the State Factory of Airplanes (KEA) 
which as a pre-Second W orId War establishment showed examples of manufacturing 
airplanes for the Air Force. Thus the original defence industry development programme 
included the following projects (Tsolakidis, 2002): 
6 Military appropriations are funded one year at a time; h.owe~er. they are norma~Jy authorized seve.raJ 
years (i.e. 5-year plan) with funding levels adju.sted due to IOtlat~o~ o.f each ~ear. It IS also.called.a ~OIlIO.g 
defence budget since it includes purchases whIch are repeated If It IS possIble to be reahsed \\ IthlO thIS 
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(i) Hellenic Aerospace Industry (EAB) established (1975) as a major 
maintenance and overhaul facility for military aircraft and helicopters. 
(ii) Hellenic Arms Industry (EBO) was set up (1977) for the licensed 
production of the Heckler & Koch light infantry weapons. 
(iii) Hellenic Vehicles Industry (ELBO) was created in cooperation \\ith the 
Austrian firm Steyr-Daimler-Punch (originally as STEYR Hellas) to 
manufacture the over structures of heavy army trucks. 
(iv) Hellenic Electronics Industry (ELBHL) was later transformed to \'arious 
private electronics industries (ELFON. NETCOM, INTRACOM etc.) 
trying to absorb the first demands for military radio and other digital 
communication equipment, optical and laser technology items (DID, 
1995). 
Currently, apart from the 85 defence firms originally mentioned there are 150 
in fact which are members of the Hellenic Defence Industries Association but only the 
first group are involved in defence-related products on a more permanent base. 
According to the Hellenic Defence Industries Catalogue (HELDIC. 2004) published by 
Hellenic Defence Industries Association these companies are classified as follows: 
(a) Aerospace Industry and Repair Sector: 7.7% 
(b) Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Sector: 2.55% 
(c) Military and Armoured Vehicles Sector: 5.1 % 
(d) Shipbuilding sector: 5.3% 
(e) Electronics and Telecommunication: 16.6% 
(f) Electrical Products and Electro-optics sector: 5.2% 
(g) Command, Control and Communications sector: 2.550/0 
(h) Metal Works, Machining and Spare Parts sector: 35.9% 
(i) Arrnouring, Passive Defence Products and Military Accessories sector: 
9% 
(j) Services, Software and Quality Control sector: 9% 
(k) Unmanned Air Vehicles and Target Systems sector: 2,55% 
By industrial sector all companies could be categorized in general as: 
• Metal Products and structures: 37% 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Electrical and electronics equipment: 25.8% 
Transport equipment: 18.5% 
Machinery: 9.260/0 
Rubber and plastics: 9.36% 
The first observation of Greek defence companies shows that they are separated 
mainly in two large groups: public and private manufacturing firms. Here it must be 
mentioned that PYRKAL and EBO merged into Hellenic Defence Systems and Hellenic 
Shipyards as well as ELBO have been privatised recently. Although the state-owned 
companies are larger than the private ones they are not as profitable as the latter 
(Defendory Conference, 2004). The second observation has to do with the actual output 
of the defence industry in terms of technology. The products produced are of relatively 
low technology and are principally parts and subassemblies of larger weapon systems 
manufactured under joint venture or co-production agreements with major international 
manufacturers who had obligations to the Ministry of Defence with the Offset Benefits 
programmes (ibid). The ratio of net fixed assets versus the number of employees forms 
a basic technological intensity indicator, which can be applied in the case of Greek 
defence companies. Therefore it is found that four of the major producers (three public 
and one private) are among the 12 companies with the highest technological intensity in 
country. Consequently, as this indicator is strongly related to the production technology 
itself one could consider these firms as technological pushers for the whole defence 
industry (Kollias and Rafailidis, 2003). Again, the aim remains a high value added 
which could be achieved in several cases by firms utilizing low value assets as in 
information technology (IT) industry where intellectual capital outperforms physical 
capital. 
When the Greek government decided that the country should participate in the 
global economic system in view of the parallel participation in the EU and European 
Monetary Unification (EMU) they had to follow a bifurcated way. First to be integrated 
into international trade and the respective financial streams and second to involye into 
the global technology and outcoming production. Radosevic (1999) maintains that the 
first dimension is not deep but the second dimension has the characteristics of real 
integration of a country into the worldwide economic system. Although the first \\ay is 
very important, it is incoming and outcoming technological flows that playa pivotal 
role for Greek economic development and competitiyeness. Towards this end. the 
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industrial base of the country must be wider and to achieve this technologies should be 
imported which in tum have to be absorbed by local firms. Even though the aim of 
increased value added has not been reached yet, the competition of produced goods is 
based on prices. However a few manufacturers of electronics and telecommunications 
exist who are integrated in the international market supporting famous compames 
abroad with the totality of their production (Kollias and Rafailidis. 2003). 
Coming back to the fact of the technological distance existed between the Greek 
defence industry and similar industries in main military equipment exporting countries. 
some issues can be perceived. First of all, Greece imports almost all-capital equipment 
required for production and secondly the pre-condition for future development is the 
collaboration in technological projects with foreign partners. The local partner must 
provide a minimum technological capability before entering into global production. 
This is often lacking as explained in the next sub-section presenting the Offset Benefits 
expenence. Therefore technological advancement is a matter of conscious and 
continuous learning effort to go much further than technological frontiers. The 
concentration of forces and recourses needs to be done within the framework of a 
certain strategy which is expressed by the Technology Foresight programme. 
Human resources remain the key factor for the recipient country of advanced 
technologies. There is no chance to manage offered know-how without the adequately 
educated and trained (both off-the-job and on-the-job) personnel ready to acquire, 
accumulate and improve the imported knowledge. This human capital exists either in 
country or abroad and the responsibility belongs to the governmental policy. which 
should plan the motivation and corresponding preparation of these individuals. In 
parallel this strategic could stop the brain drain outside Greece especially in western 
countries. 
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4.4 European Defence Industry 
When talking about the European defence industry we mean the companies. 
which belong to the EU member states now numbering twenty-five~. Greece as a 
member state is directly influenced by EU policy and directives. therefore it is useful to 
examine the environment, which obeys the same rules. The EU defence industrials \\ere 
obliged to operate in a different world under new political and economical conditions 
starting from 1985 and not only because of the Maastricht aims. All these had the effect 
on the stronger European countries of reviewing their defence policy. which brought 
changes to the structure of the military forces. The respective impact on defence budget 
was a 50% decrease (€205 billion in 1990 and €108 billion in 2003) (NDASP, 2004). 
Apart from the new targets of the EU, the international markets also shrunk 
while the competition, especially from the USA, is aggressively supported directly by 
the governments. The European share internationally has fallen from 56% to 30% 
within the last fifteen years and keeps decreasing rapidly (Defence Analysis Institute. 
2003). 
In view of these facts, the EU has prepared a master plan of actions (ibid) 
towards the solutions of existing problems together with the assurances of conditions 
for further development of the defence industrial network. Among the various steps is 
the foundation of a common European market of military and paramilitary equipment 
accompanied by the avoidance of overlap in research and technology (R&T) policy 
among the nations of the old continent. 
The European Commission also encourages mergers and acquisitions, which 
lead to the establishment of big business groups capable of competing with US rivalries. 
Privatization belongs to this new strategic plan in order to free companies from the 
asphyxia caused by governmental embracement. The common European policy in 
defence and security will improve the interdependence of EU countries in managing 
crises in different areas like internal or external conflicts. terrorism. cost etTecti \'e 
support of Armed Forces, through interoperability and commonality. same orientation 
7 A defence industry and technology base is the combination of people institutions. technological knnw-
how and facilities used to design. develop. manufacture and maintain the weapons and supporting defence 
equipment needed to meet national security objectives. 
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III R&T, better use of national resources, reduction of unemployment and other 
associated social benefits. 
The autonomy and independence of EU defence is a vital factor for the aboye 
targets. Presently 300/0 of the defence material used in Europe is of US origin. The 
overlap of production lines is another serious point. For instance. only in EU -+ different 
programmes for battle tanks and 16 programmes for personnel armored carriers are 
maintained while in the USA the corresponding programme numbers are only 1 and 3 
respectively. The rationality in effectively using the resources of all kinds also contains 
the approach of technologically innovative items for the development of dual type 
equipment, which are ready to perform - or after minor adaptation - for both types of 
uses, military or civil. Therefore, when military expenditute is constrained, the factories 
could shift to civil material production lines thus amortizing fluctuation of demands 
(Moran, 1990). 
R&T in defence provides a substantial leverage for the modernization of weapon 
platforms applying less expensive innovative ideas through the incorporation of 
knowledge-intensive technologies. For this purpose the amount of € 9 billion allocated 
by EU for R&T programmes should increase drastically to shorten the gap existing 
between the € 35 billion in USA. A significant contribution to this aim could be a bigger 
part of budget for national R&T to be directed in defence related research. Again in the 
USA 55.3% of state budget for R&T is devoted to defence projects while France and 
the UK allow less than 30% for this purpose. Greece has anticipated through a common 
inter-ministerial decision the amount of 1 % of all defence expenses to be directed for 
R&T but this has never been materialized (MoD and MoE, 2000). 
4.5 Offset Benefits (OB) 
Greece started the OB experience thirty years ago when the first Mirage F 1 CG 
airplanes were bought. The main effort has began in 1981 when the Defence Industry 
Directorate (DID) established a special office in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) \\here 
the first guidelines on OB were prepared. In parallel the Ministry of Economy (~loE) 
established a similar office to handle respectiYe OB from the Air Traffic Contwi 
-+~ 
project. Afterwards (1985) MoE undertook the global responsibility for all OB covering 
every public procurement. The main reason behind this action was the idea to use OB as 
a leverage for development. From 1994 on, no OBs were asked for public procurement 
except for the MoD, which has been handling its own programmes since then 
(Tsolakidis, 2001). In Table 2 below some cumulative data are presented showing the 
importance of the OB 
Total Contracts 
Total Progammes 
Value of Contracts 
167 
766 
13.5 billion € 
14.7 billion € 
3,210 billion € 
OB Credit Value 
OB Nominal Value 
Table 2. Offset Benefits Contracts (1996-2001) 
The basic aims of Greek OB today are defined below (MoD Guidelines, 1996) 
a. To support local defence industry-state and private- and to develop / 
support further the business opportunities which contribute directly or 
indirectly at the upgrading of the technological and industrial 
infrastructure of the country. 
b. To strengthen Military Forces in an effective way through the supply of 
equipment and services where appropriate. 
c. To decrease substantially the procurement cost of the defence material 
through the indirect return of the biggest part of the expenditures. 
Eligible OB should fall in the next categories (ibid): 
1. 
11. 
Purchase of Greek defence products or services and the award to a local 
firm of subcontracting work for manufacturing military items 
Production in-country of new, complete autonomous products as well as 
subassemblies and spare parts of weapon systems through transfer of 
technology together with personnel training or any technical support. 
The supplier could also participate financially in order to create an 
infrastructure specific for the material under consideration. It IS 
necessary that the transaction also includes partial absorption of the new 
production by the supplier who should provide respective licences too 
for the Greek market. 
111. Direct investments to increase the capital of an industrial firm (either 
existing or under establishment). The condition here remains the inyestor 
to participate in the long-term financial activities of the said firm. 
IV. Any grant of capital equipment to public defence industries. 
v. Similarly, any grant of material or even services to the Armed Forces 
such as defence material, production and test equipment, information 
technology hardware and software or any other type being of high 
interest to the MoD. 
4.5.1 MoD Guidelines 
The guidelines set up by MoD for OB are briefly described just to form an idea 
of the procedure (Kantas, 2002). In general, a seller is responsible for signing an OB 
agreement with the buyer only when the total procurement contract value exceeds the 
equivalent of € 1.2 millions. Correspondingly, OB total volume should reach at least 
60% of the foreign currency part of the procurement contract and it is obligatory to 
include subcontracting work or purchase of defence materials and/or production of new 
products reaching the minimum of 50% of OB total credit value. The formula, which 
defines OBis 
C = n x E, 
where C is the OB credit value, E the procurement contract amount (including material 
prices, transportation/insurances, taxes (national and international) and license royalties) 
and n the credit coefficient according to the nature and the volume of the work, the 
technological level and the kind of the charge-free support provided (training. 
documentation, technology. technical support etc.). 
The license must be valid in the Greek market for a period over 15 years while 
the foreign contractor undertakes the commitment of the partial absorption of the ne\\ 
production with a minimum credit value equal to 70% of all credit yalues accumulated 
sum for the technology / know-how transfer and the technical support / training. 
Thus the total credit amount could be expressed as 
with n i as the various coefficient ranging from 1 to 12 and more specifically 
1 < nl :S 8, 1 < n2:S 8, 1 < n3 < 10, 1 < ns:S 8, 1 < n6 :S 10. 1 < n7:S 12 
Ei pertain the various costs which are: 
E I : the nominal cost of the technology / know-how transfer 
E2: the nominal cost of the charge-free technical support and training provided 
E3: the level of participation 
E4: the purchase value of new products 
Es: the amount of direct investment 
E6: the current value of the equipment offered to state-owned firms. In case of used 
equipment they subtract the amount corresponding to the depreciation during its 
use before 
E7: the market value of the materials or services granted to the Armed Forces 
M: it covers all cost of surcharges (transport, insurance, taxes, installation costs etc.) of 
the items E6 and E7 
The total implementation period for the OB realization is supposed to be the 
same period with the main procurement contract and, if needed, there can be awarded a 
grace period too. If part of the OB obligation has not been fulfilled at the end of the 
agreed implementation period of OB the supplier has to pay the amount equal to 10% of 
this OB unfulfilled part which amount is taken from the corresponding already 
deposited bank guarantee. 
It is worthwhile to be mentioned here that OB proposal plays a significant role 
during the evaluation of the global competitive proposal as it comes out the formula of 
reflective value 
Procurement Cost 
Reflective Value = -------------------------
(0.8) x Technical Evaluation Grading+(0.2) x OB Evaluation Grading 
The evaluation of OB policy so far is difficult because there is a lack of 
information concerning the implementation of these contracts because General 
Directorate of Armaments and its evolution the General Secretariat of MoD are neither 
an efficient organization nor can supply data since defence contracts are classified 
(Antonakis, 1996). In any case, there is an important transfer of technology and know-
how to domestic producers and this investment will have future yields in the form of 
improved technological capability and increased productivity. Some examples of critical 
high technologies absorbed through OB are presented in Table 3 below. 
1. CATIA CAD/CAM (Hellenic Aerospace Industry, Air Force University) 
2. EUCLIDE CAD/CAM (Hellenic Arms Industry / Crete Technical University) 
3. UHF Airborne Radio (Hellenic Aerospace Industry) 
4. VHF Portable Radios (Intracom) 
5. Wiring / Harnesses manufacturing and control technologies (ELFON) 
6. Multiple layer printed circuit boards (Metelco) 
7. Hot section aeroturbines parts technologies (HAl) 
8. High accuracy technology for missiles (Olympic Tool) 
9. High power aeroengines test stand (HAl) 
10. Coproduction of airborne ammunition (PYRKAL) 
11. Naval technologies for frigates and submarines (Hellenic Shipyards) 
12. Electromagnetic Compatibility Anechoic chamber (ACT) 
13. Metrology technologies (Space Hellas) 
14. Spectrum of electro-optics items (THEON / ECON / HAl) 
15. Material and Geostructure Mechanics (Penteli Institute) 
16. Chemical treatment of metals (HAl) 
17. Plasma uses (EBET AM / HAl) 
18. Aluminium alloys thermal treatment through tribology (Niko1co) 
19. Titanium, inox steel and light metals hardness tests (HAl) 
20. High speed mechanical manufacturing (HAl / EBO) 
21. Aeronautical technologies for manufacturing and maintenance (HAl) 
22. Quality Control and Assurance Methods 
23. High accuracy mechanical parts through CNC (HAl / Grammenos) 
Table 3. New Technologies Transferred to Greek Industries through Offset 
Benefits 
Analysis and Recommendations 
The firms appearing in this list as recipients of the corresponding technologi~~ 
were able to capitalize on OB because they had an intermediate technological distance 
with the foreign manufacturers. Thus they had the technological capability to assimilate 
the offered know-how and use it properly. The problem with OB is that the majority of 
Greek industries wanting to be involved in OB transaction are not able to materialize 
such technology transfers because they belong to a much lower technological level. 
Therefore foreign industries are practically forced to select non-complex forms of 
collaboration. Licensing is a simple form of know-how absorption, which helps in the 
acquisition of better technological qualities. On the other hand, this means accepting 
transferred technology by a certain supplier which should be cost-effective. Without 
well prepared personnel, adequate infrastructure and realistic prioritization the 
technological accumulation by the local partner is a waste of time and money even if the 
partner is willing and capable to offer the required knowledge (Rafailidis. 2003). 
In conclusion OB has had a positive influence on Greek technological and 
scientific level and the executed transfer of all technologies is useful here and in other 
countries too. The national economy has also benefited by OB and within 20 years the 
number of private Greek enterprises involved in OB have increased by 500% (they 
started from 20 in 1983 and now exceed 100) officially recorded in Hellenic Defence 
Industries Catalogue (2004). Moreover there are about 2.000 smaller units. which are 
activated not exclusively in defence but according to main producers needs and they are 
registered in Hellenic Industrial Subcontractors Association. 
Anyhow there has been a debate on various sides whether OB has contributed to 
defence procurement and the new government plans to bring some changes to OB 
procedures in the new law, which is under preparation. The recommendations below is 
an output from the general multiyear experience in OB as they were expressed during 
the last Defendory 2004 conference in Athens. The WG of the TF programme has taken 
these proposals seriously into account because they are directly linked with the transfer 
of Aerospace and Defence Technologies in Greece up to 2020. 
• 
Formation of a new broader but stricter legislatiYe frame\\"ork instead of 
the unique pamphlet of guidelines 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
OB minimum total volume should be 200% and not only 60% 
Credit coefficients of 1.5 value must be used in some cases as incentiH~s 
to promote specific industrial products 
Faster procedures for OB crediting 
Shorter negotiation period for OB contracts 
Reduction of time for OB implementation. It is proposed to be the half of 
the main contract endurance. Additionally instead of imposed penalties if 
there are problems during OB implementation to extend the main 
contract payment schedule proportionally 
Flexibility in replacement of the initial programmes with other 
alternatives if required 
Intensive monitoring and control of contractual obligations: frequent 
visits, progress reports and total workload division in sub periods 
Encouragement to OB offering 
- New work positions 
Quality of investments: high technology, long-term and viable 
programmes, high Greek added value, acceleration of economic 
and technological development, production of dual-use items 
- Strategic alliances with foreign big industries 
• Cancellation of unprogrammed grants of materials or serVIces to the 
Armed Forces. On the contrary, the grant should contain items from a list 
where special military equipment or infrastructure technologies should 
be prerecorded. In parallel to ensure their most effective exploitation and 
support without any surcharge of the initial procurement cost 
• Coverage of OB positions with skillful, professional and authorized 
individuals who could fight bureaucratic phenomena. 
4.5.2 Prioritization of Technologies with Wide Applications 
The researcher has further located such technologies important for R&D in 
Aerospace and Defence8. The presented technologies - apart from those analysed in 
8 MoD for internal purposes distinguishes between Research and Development. In their terms. work is 
"development" if it is directly linked to a specific equipment project. It is "research" if it is of a more 
general nature. not related to the procurement of any specific item of equipment. 
Chapter 7 - reflect the direct responses to the questionnaire and the followed 
discussions during the interviews. 
They are additional technologies either genenc or infratechnologies9. which 
apply in many domains during systems development and should also be considered 
seriously. These are presented in the Table 4. 
1. Platform and System Concept Studies 
2. Requirement's Capture and Definition 
3. Effectiveness and Performance Design 
4. Digitization of the Battle Space 
5. Systems Engineering and Integrated System Design 
6. Safety Systems 
7. Architectures 
8. Information and Data Fusion Technology 
9. Synthetic Environments Generation 
10. Reliability and Maintainability of Systems 
11. COTS Software Assessment 
12. Data and Information Management Technology 
13. Combined Operational Effectiveness and Investment Appraisals 
14. Life Cycle Improvement 
15. Cost Engineering 
16. Concurrent Engineering 
17. Skills Training Systems for Individuals and Teams 
18. Human Information Processing 
19. Test and Evaluation Facilities 
Table 4: Technologies with Wide Applications 
9 As infratechnologies, we mean an instrumental basis of R&D including the .scientific data nec~ssary for 
the operation of measurement, test. control and trial, methods and research Instruments. techmques and 
know ledge. .f C) 
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SCENARIO PLANNING 
5.1 Theoretical Background 
Organizational leaders are in a continuous search to understand the 
environments in which they operate. They have been using several methods - strategic 
planning, integrated strategic change, transorganizational development or open system 
planning - to achieve this (Mintzberg, 1994). One of the techniques towards this 
understanding is scenario planning, broadly admitted as quite effective for examining 
future uncertainties and investigating all types of assumption in various organizations 
(Schwartz, 1996). 
This method consists of organising information and future possibilities into 
alternative visions for the future, especially useful to comprehend events that seem to 
contain a mixture of unrelated information. Scenario method can be extrapolative or 
normative depending on the starting point. The scenarios themselves must be internally 
consistent pictures of future possibilities and should be composed of a mixture of 
quantifiable and non-quantifiable components arranged as alternative logical string of 
events. Scenarios writing is particularly helpful in the decision making process. In fact, 
this method is useful in terms of lowering the level of uncertainties and raising the \e\e \ 
of knowledge. Scenarios can be combined with other methods, such as workshops or 
Delphi questionnaires (Masini Barbieri, 1993) 
In a world that changes rapidly and which seems very unpredictable, scenarios 
appear to be useful in preparing for an uncertain future and they are gaining credibility 
to improve performance in a dynamic environment by altering models of thinking and 
by testing decisions (Chermack et aL 2001). During the last 20 years the increasing 
demand for tools like scenario building has become reality and the \arious applicants 
are looking for difficult answers to questions about the prediction of the future and how 
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to face any arising crisis lO. One of the problems is that fast growing practice of scenario 
planning is not supported by adequate research and theory development so far. 
Despite its achievements in the practical world of business and public policy. 
the scenario method has been of marginal interest in academia. The puzzling nature of 
scenarios may be one reason for this. They deal with the world of speculation and in the 
same time scenario analysis/building! planning are indispensable for any social 
activities based upon choice and deliberation political, business or military (Fauconnier 
and Turner, 2002). However the epistemic function of scenarios can be seen in its 
definitions, both given by Schwartz (1998) as 
"A tool for ordering one's perceptions about alternative future environments 
in which one's decisions might be played out" 
or as 
"A set of organized ways for us to dream effectively about our own future" 
Therefore scenarios either in the common sense understanding (as a habitual 
pre-decision procedure) or in the technical understanding (as modeling using 
interdisciplinary approaches) operate at the epistemic level as a thought experiment and 
at the cognitive level as conceptual blending (Aligica, 2005)11. Finally. the general 
method of Lynham (2002), the diamond model of Van de Ven (2004) and the classical 
8-step theory building of Dubin (Fig.3) are some efforts to fill this theoretical gap. 
In the Greek TF, the Working Group for Aerospace and Defence Technologies 
has built three scenarios which are presented below and intend to help policy makers to 
understand what is happening and why in order to make their own prediction. The 
scenarios are constructed in three phases (Cristensen and Raynor, 2003) 
1) Description of the anticipated phenomena 
2) Classification of these phenomena into categories and 
3) When phenomena might occur what hypotheses could be formulated. 
10 One has to remember that the Chinese write the word "crisis" using two ideograms: one means 
opportunity, the second means danger. 
II The terms "visions" or "scenarios" are mostly used as interchangeable ones in the Foresight literature. 
although "scenarios" might well also have a narrower meaning: a "time-line" of actions and e\ ents 
leading to a specific end state. 
~ 1 
Units 
Laws of interaction 
Boundaries 
System States 
Propositions 
Empirical indicators of 
key terms 
Hypotheses 
Testing 
Steps 1 to 5 
Steps 6 to 8 
Fig.3 Eight-step theory building research methodology 
Part One: The 
theoretical model 
Part Two: The 
theory research 
Postma and Liebl (2003) propose three alternative ways for scenario design. 
These include recombinant scenarios, context scenarios and inconsistent scenarios. In 
this research a mixed model of the three has been followed. The reason is that firstly 
scenarios have been distinguished by different recombinations of trends, secondly there 
is a need to investigate the variation of the contexts to find out about their consequences 
and thirdly the recognition of cross-impacts and high-inconsistency can lead to a 
possible fact (Table 5). 
The present scenario preparation is based upon the recognition by the Working 
Group as being important the general political and economic environment. The macro-
analysis of this environment is necessary because this specific sector depends directly 
on the international political balance and the global economic reality. This frame 
includes, among others, European - American relations, emerging European military 
cooperation, the new NATO structure, asymmetric threats and modem security issues. 
Top-down Mixed Bottom-up 
a roaches approaches approaches 
Exploratory (1) 
approaches 
Mixed (4) 
approaches 
Normative (7) 
approaches 
Analysts define 
"what-if' scenarios 
Analysts define 
scenarios based on 
different 
theories/perspectives 
Analysts defme 
normative end-state 
scenanos 
Table 5. Taxonomy of scenarios 
(2) Analysts heavily 
structure group 
discussion or survey 
instruments to focus 
on a few predefined 
exploratory scenarios 
(5) Analysts define 
normative profiles, 
these are elaborated 
by experts 
(8) Analysts define 
normative scenarios, 
experts comment on 
them, identify key 
issues 
(3) 
(6) 
(9) 
Experts involved in free -
form scenario workshop. 
or provide sUJvey 
responses (e.g. 
conventional fo recast 
Delphi) which are grouped 
by stati stical methods to 
yield scenarios 
Experts grouped according 
to worldviews and 
expectations by statistical 
methods or discuss ion. and 
then elaborate scenarios as 
distinct groups 
Experts involved in free-
form normative scenario 
workshop, or provide 
survey responses (e.g. 
goals , Delphi) which are 
grouped by statistical 
methods to yield scenarios 
Practically the three scenarios are developed according to the method of Bood 
(1997) and Ringland (1998) following 12 discrete steps (Table 6) 
Step 1: Identify local issue or decision 
Step 2: Key forces in the local environment 
Step 3: Driving forces 
Step 4: Rank by importance and uncertainty 
Step 5: Select the scenario logics 
Step 6: Fleshing out the scenarios 
Step 7: Implications for strategy 
Step 8: Selection of leading indicators and signposts 
Step 9: Feed the scenarios back to those consulted 
Step 10: Discuss the strategic options 
Step 11: Agree the implementation plan 
Step 12: Publicize the scenarios 
Table 6. A representation of the process of scenario development. 
5.2 The "ELYSIAN FIELDS" scenario 
The structure of the global system is based on a cooperative model (monopolic 
or multipolic). International Governance, however, cannot be considered as a possible 
event. The influence and prestige of international institutions and the acceptance of 
Justice worldwide are not at a high level. Transatlantic relationships are smooth in 
general and there is an internal agreement for role distribution between the USA and the 
EU. The EU structure is very close to the model of federational Europe. Concerning the 
Central European Policy for Defence and Security in conjunction with the European 
Defence Industry there is an essential and fast progress towards a common European 
defence capability. 
A clear improvement can be seen in reducing the economic gap between North 
and South, in tackling with the "Grey Zone" issues (overpopulation, religious 
extremism, immigration trends etc.) while confrontation of "Asymmetric Threats" 
(terrorism, organized crime, illegal refugees etc.) is successful. The management of 
global environmental problems has advanced smoothly while in the domain of energy 
there is a significant evolution after the exploitation of new, environmental friendly 
energy resources (independence from oil) which will have implications for international 
power correlations. Immigration is under control while it is beneficial for both sides. 
Concerning the peripheral tensions, Ba1cans are characterized by problems 
related to their development and participation in the EU, while in Turkey there is a 
realization of changes, a complete democratisation. entry to EU and peaceful 
arrangement of problems with Greece (including the Cyprus issue). In the Middle East 
there is a final positive solution to the Palestinian problem, political stabilization and 
democracy in Iraq, democratic changes and economic development in most Arabic 
states is accompanied by a general transformation in the wider area. The consequences 
of this evolution for the Greek security are important. Greece feels secure within the 
framework of the EU and NATO. The population is increasing rather marginally while 
the various immigrants are gradually being integrated into local societies. 
The Armed Forces have covered their needs after the planned reform to semi-
professional and their participation in the European Forces. As basic missions. tht:\ 
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maintain participation in peacekeeping operations and confront the so called 
"'asymmetric threats". The Public Security services still need higher investment in 
personnel training and the necessary equipment to execute their objectiYes where the 
management crisis of disasters is also included. 
As a result of such an international environment there will be a gradual 
decrease in Greek defence expenditure, reaching the average of EU member states. At 
the same time there will be a redesign of the defence budget towards high technology 
weapons acquisition and the formation of rapid intervention units for facing the modern 
threats. All this is done according to the extension of Central European Policy for 
Defence and Security and the corresponding Greek obligation to share in the common 
European defence budget. Given the aforementioned, Greek Defence Industry is 
anticipated to be organically incorporated into the workload distribution for the 
production of military equipment always after conforming with competitiveness and 
cost effectiveness criteria. This collaboration and interconnection, together with 
participation in common R&D programmes will drive the reallocation of defence 
industries leading to the creation of many small and flexible firms of high technological 
specialization in specific products and services. Consequently, this will force the 
traditional companies with only low levels of knowledge and invested capital to 
withdraw, leaving space for business units capable of operating as sole-source 
contractors. Moreover the secure environment allows for long-term planning (over 10 
years) in science and technology, increasing financing opportunities of strategic 
research. 
5.3 The "JANUS" scenario 
The structure of the global system is based on a monopolic-despotic or a 
multipolic-conflicting model (China could figure as the main opponent of the USA). 
The influence and prestige of international institutions and the keeping of justice rules 
all over the world are relatively restricted. Transatlantic relations are rather disturbed. 
The EU hard-core structure is very close to the model of federal Europe, while the rest 
of the member states have the choice of a loose union (i.e. common market). The 
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Central European Policy for Defence and Security and the joint European Defence 
Industry are advancing at a slow pace. 
The "Grey Zone" issues and economic gap between North and South remain 
static or slightly changing (either worsening or improving) while the ··Asymmetric 
Threats" seem to be under a relative control but they stand as serious menaces. Most of 
the Earth's environmental problems are being managed smoothly but energ: 
requirements are still dependent on oil and coal mining. Immigration waves provoke 
local problems and regional tensions. 
Concerning the peripheral situation, the Balcans peninsula is quite stable 
without a parallel solution in existing problems. Although Turkey has achieved some 
reforms it is limited to a special relationship with the EU (not full participation) and the 
bilateral problems with Greece are still unsolved. The Palestinian problem has been 
adjusted together with political tranquillity in Iraq but the general periphery instability 
is maintained at high levels. 
The implications of these events to Greek security are determinative. Greece is 
relatively secure within the framework of a looser EU or even in an Atlantic-sovereign 
situation. The population still moves in marginal increases and immigrants are only 
integrated in to Greek society occasionally or in accordance with the rules of the labour 
market. 
The Armed Forces have completed their reform to semi-professional rapid 
intervention flexible small units force with a basic mission to defend against an 
aggressive neighbour (Turkey) and in parallel to participate in peace-keeping operations 
and confront the asymmetric threats to the European Army. The Public Security Forces 
tries to invest more heavily in training and in obtaining necessary equipment to perform 
their missions enlarged with crisis management issues. 
The defence budget is expected to decrease more or less relatiyely to the 
spectrum mobility of the JANUS scenario in order to reach a better effecti\eness of the 
allocated financial resources. Further, the defence industry will be obliged to make a 
partial or extensive reorganization where the only survivors will be the companies. 
which have made investments in knowledge and capital assets. The public sector has to 
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support the rest of the enterprises according to their importance to Greek defence 
planning and the Greek economy otherwise they will be out of business. Essentialh a 
shrinking of this industrial branch arrives, together with the emergence of the so-calIt:d 
"National Champions". These companies together with the other surviving firms \\-ill be 
awarded subcontracts of the main European or US weapon systems purchased b:-
Greece since there will be a general positive trend in defence expenses. Promotion of 
technological cooperation means know-how transfer in a country based on the criteria of 
one-way directed influence (i.e. USA/EU towards Greece). 
5.4 The "ARMAGEDON" Scenario 
The structure of the global system is mostly chaotic either due to the loss of 
USA sovereign role or because this country is becoming isolated. The influence and 
prestige of international institutions and the presentation of worldwide justice rules are 
almost inexistent. A deep crack characterizes transatlantic relations while the EU 
presents a lack of coherence, facing a clear risk to dismandle. The EU hard-core 
structure is closer than ever to the model of federal Europe while the other nations 
cannot select anything but the loose union (i.e. common market chances). No progress 
appears to the Central European Policy for Defence and Security and the unification of 
European defence industrial entities. 
There is neither control on the asymmetric threats nor on the '"Grey Zone" 
issues while the economic gap between North and South deepens. More than one global 
environmental problems has escaped human control with serious local or international 
impacts and a shortage of energy resources is observed. Massive immigration 
displacements create serious problems and frustrations. 
The Balkans return to the era of "explosive powder stock house" and in Turkey 
internal instability occurs: a reanimation of the Islamic and Kurdish movements. a 
failure to join EU resulting to an aggressive external policy and peripheral stress with 
Greece. In the Middle East the already long-term difficult issues cannot be handled any 
more and this transforms the area into an open field of clashes. 
Consequently these events for Greece' s security are very important. Greece 
feels unsafe within a split EU or in a North-South environment of generalized conflicts. 
Concerning the demographic case there is again a marginal population increase and 
simultaneously a blockage of the entrance of immigrants is applied \vhich is 
accompanied by an effort to create minorities issues artificially. 
To cover the requirements of Greek Armed Forces a return to a large-scale 
army of draftees is needed to increase the number of both officers and non-
commissioned officers, focusing on the deterrence of external attacks and the 
confrontation of asymmetric threats. Security agencies have an upgraded role in order to 
face the modem menaces and the severe control of illegal immigrants. An upgrade of 
the crisis management mechanism must be effected the soonest possible. 
The ARMAGEDON scenario proposes that the Armed Forces prepare heavily 
equipped rapid intervention brigades which will be capable of attacking diverse targets 
in parallel with the demonstration of their power (using ballistic or cruise missiles). The 
defence budget remains at present levels or ever higher in the case of extreme events or 
increased dangers. The ability to keep a high level of defence expenditure depends on 
the growth of the national economy. To improve the defence effectiveness of the 
invested amounts furthermore, the relative budget must be rationalized because it is not 
possible to increase expenditures due to public income limitations. Hence, there arises 
the requirement to improve the ratio of domestically produced to imported military 
systems in order to achieve an effective feedback mechanism from defence towards 
economy. For this purpose in-country research, technology and development (RTD) 
must be strengthened, the national defence industry should be partially autonomous (i.e. 
like Israel) taking into account Greece's revenues and existing technological level. The 
branch is concentrated around the big traditional factories. which compose the trunk of 
the defence industrial complex. 
A development of synergies with other countries - outside of NATO - IS 
realized at the same time and some small firms, usually the smaller ones. try to produce 
"dual use" equipment useful for both military and civil applications (Chapter 8). The 
technological priorities are diverted towards reverse engineering and the clweragc of 
short-term needs. Besides all these, there is an orchestrated coverage effort to push 
exports for financial and external policy reasons too. 
Some conclusions 
The preparation of the three scenanos was based on the use of yariables 
defined by the Working Group as catalytic for the defence industry and Armed Forces 
in Greece. Some of the factors, which have modulated the scenarios, are distinguished 
as more important than the others. Thus, the field of the competitiveness of the Gre~k 
Defence Industry and of the research, which is compulsory for the Research and 
Technology Policy, are linearly dependent on the perspectives of Central European 
Policy for Defence and Security and the evolution of a transatlantic relationship. 
The Working Group in any case foresees a relative technological autonomy of 
the nation and the decrease of dependence upon foreign agents. The defficiencies in the 
defence industry and research (coming from low technological return, loss of 
opportunities to cooperate with foreign contractors, lack of official mapping of defence 
business units, reduced financing for research projects) could be amortized after close 
cooperation and coordination of the respective research directorates of the Ministry of 
Defence and the Ministry of Development. 
General policy proposals include 
The creation of model programmes for Research and Technology 
development 
Generous financing of the scientific research and re-evaluation of 
defence budget targets 
The adaptation of educational and skills development priorities as well as 
best use of human resources especially on the interdisciplinary characters 
of critical technologies (as proposed in Chapter 8). 
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6 
RESEARCH PROCESS AND 
METHODOLOGY 
6.1 General Approach 
Research process and methodology must be developed properly in order the 
links of research spiral to serve their aims as per Rudestan and Newton (2001) 
description. The aim of the research is to find out which are the future key technologies 
in Aerospace and Defence which should be developed up to 2020 in Greece. Moreover 
to investigate the role of human factors integration into the design and development of 
these high-technology systems. Also the interrelationship between military and civil 
technologies leading to the creation of the so-called dual-use technologies is examined 
because they are very critical for the national resources management (Appendix 6). 
The approach used in this research is a multi method. Although the principal 
method is the Delphi technique in order to implement its process there were used 
additional methods which included documentation, interviews and questionnaires as 
they are presented in the following sub-chapters. The general strategy for doing this 
research is also a combination for fieldwork and deskwork because each complements 
the other. Moreover even though the form of this research is qualitative, certain 
characteristics of quantitative methodology could not be left out since the use of 
questionnaire as a research technique belongs to this research family. From the early 
phases of TF (Jantsch, 1967) certain quantitative and qualitative methods \\ere accepted 
as the most suitable for this kind of research and the effort here was to follow this 
pattern in the preparation of questionnaire and scenario building. Amongst qualitati\c 
methods are included the application of intuitive thinking, exploratory and normatiYe 
methods. Intuitive thinking includes brainstorming, utopian writing and science tiction 
which are more qualitative or artistic methods. For instance. brainstorming is a group 
method where a period of free thinking is used to articulate ideas. It can he an useful 
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technique for expert committees and consultation management groups. Exploratory 
methods begin with the past and present as their starting point and more toward the 
future in a heuristic manner, often looking at all available possibilities. :\ormati\e 
methods start with the future by determining future goals and objectives. then \\'ork 
backwards to see if these can be achieved given the constraints, resources and 
technologies available. Quantitative methods can be divided into time series and causal 
methods. They can be applied when three conditions exist: information about the past is 
available, this information can be quantified in the form of numerical data, it can be 
assumed that some of the aspects of the past pattern will continue into the future. 
Examples of quantitative methods include trend extrapolation, substitution theory. 
systems dynamic simulation, econometric models etc. 
6.2 The Delphi Method 
6.2.1 Evolution of Delphi 
The Delphi technique is a special featured survey method, which has taken its 
name after the Oracle at the ancient Greek site of Delphi where people used to go to get 
insights into the future. Delphi became internationally known during the 8th century BC. 
because of the oracular power of the priestess Pythia who sat on a tripod and falling into 
ecstasies made predictions about the future. Pythia was so famous among the 
Mediterranean people who believed in her views of the forthcoming events that no 
major decision was made without consulting the oracle of Delphi first. 
The Delphi method was first used in the early years after World War II to 
foresee horse racing results in the UK. Then it was originally developed by RAND 
Corporation analysts under the auspices of the US Air Force projects in the beginning of 
1950's. These projects had to do with the choice - from the enemy's point of \iew - of 
the optimal industrial targets in USA, by dropping an estimated number of atomic 
bombs. The initial experiments showed that predictions made by a group had a higher 
probability of being correct than predictions made by the same indi\iduals alone. 
Researchers have also found that individual estimates presented a tendency to con\erge 
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as the experiment continued in rounds, given that the study was designed to reach a 
consensus (Linstone, 1978). 
Within the development of the technique over the years there \\as a 
considerable broadening into a wider range of methodologies. which incorporate some 
common characteristics that still may differ in other details. Such an example is an 
application of the Delphi Method not to reach consensus but to investigate differenc~s. 
mainly by employing the disaggregating analysis approach (Riggs. 1983). Other uses of 
the method - apart from looking into the future - is to define objectives of a project or 
to practice experiences of education for a certain group of interested individuals (Dalkey 
and Helmer, 1965). 
6.2.2 Delphi features 
Delphi as a method is based on two or more round structural surveys and 
makes use of the intuitive information of the participants who have two characteristics: 
they are mainly experts and anonymous to each other. In this multi-rounded expert 
survey the results of the previous round are given as feedback to the next one. 
Therefore the involved stakeholders control their earlier predictions avoiding 
the disadvantage of possible bias during face-to-face panel deliberation. It is just an 
interactive group communication process in which knowledgeable experts are ensured 
that they are not under pressure to agree to the perceived views of senior colleagues but 
they only express their views, which are formulated by personal preferences and the 
existing qualitative data in order to shape policy decisions. Here discussions have a 
dominant role. while scientific prestige, louder voice or seniority do not directly 
influence the expression of opinions from everybody. Then, a sufficient time of 10-15 
days is given to prepare their judgment on the survey topics. 
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Figure 4. Career of the Delphi method: genealogical tree of national applications. 
Given that there are people who are more knowledgeable and experienced than 
others it makes sense to use them as part of a panel for a Delphi experiment. So it is 
reasonable to include experts because they should produce more accurate anticipations 
of the future (Best, 1974). However there are others who insist that it is unnecessary 
(Armstrong, 1985) while Wonderberg (1991) stresses that the best reliability of Delphi 
derives only from the same set of scenarios and during the same period regardless of the 
panel synthesis. Rauch (1979), followed by many researchers, distinguishes three types 
of Delphi studies. 
1) The Classical or Conventional Delphi as a tool to discover the group 
opinion of experts about future facts. Hence to reach a decision for today 
after looking into the future it ensures that the future evolves according to 
some laws or at least some regularity. Conventional Delphi can be 
distinguished into four branches as per the ways it is used 
o Possibility of future events or trends 
o Prioritizing alternative goals or objectives 
o Creating management strategies 
o Allocating scarce resources between competing options. 
2) Policy Delphi has as a purpose to clarify the position of decision makers. It 
serves to highlight all the options and supporting evidence for the 
resolution of major policy issues by dealing with ideas and concepts not 
with data and facts. 
3) Decision Delphi, on the contrary, tries to coordinate decisions \\ith 
relevance to the future, if the future does not behave according to a law 
but is influenced by a large number of small, uncoordinated decisions. The 
main social function of Decision Delphi is rather to coordinate and push 
the way the experts are thinking towards unexplored fields of social 
relations and to modify future development from real accidental cases to 
carefully considered decisions. 
6.2.3 Delphi and Foresight 
The Delphi survey is a methodology, which has been widely used by advanced 
and developing countries in many TF exercises. In Japan it was selected for the Science 
and Technology Agency in 1969 for the first time to conduct a large study for predicting 
technological and scientific future of the country. The Delphi technique was 
implemented in the new wave of large-scale government Foresight in Europe and 
Germany, France and UK were the first to join in. 
The Germans cooperated with the Japanese in their first Delphi and they v .. ere 
copied by the French, although different ministries have used in parallel the critical 
technologies approach. The UK in both rounds of TF has used Delphi successfully and 
Austria, Hungary, The Czech Republic and Spain have followed the same path. 
Recently, the European Union Commission has initiated translation of Delphi exercises 
while Mediterranean member states (Italy, France, Spain, Greece as well as Portugal) 
have begun dynamic participants in regional TF cases already. 
Outside Europe other countries like South Korea, Turkey, New Zealand, South 
Africa, USA have also organised national Foresight programmes, which were based on 
Delphi (Taeyoung, 2000). 
6.2.4 Delphi as an overarching approach 
The Delphi technique is used in judgment and forecasting where pure model-
based statistical methods are impractical and impossible. Delphi is not a scientific tool 
nor is related to a scientific experiment or a scientifically structured activity (Coates, 
1975). It can be characterized as a systematic bottom-up method for eliciting and 
collating informed judgments on a particular issue, through the circulation of a carefully 
designed questionnaire (Andersen et al, 2004). 
This method has a number of advantages. Firstly, it permits a synthesis of the 
views of large number of experts and disseminates those pieces of information. By 
doing so, contributes to consensus building or identifies dissenting views. Secondly. it is 
suitable for looking at the longer-term through the process of concentration. Lastly. it 
65 
can be applied in different countries, thus allowing the researcher to compare the results 
and to identify the effect of any national influences (e.g. the Greek case). 
In TF the true Delphi goal was unknown future events to be assessed by a 
diversity of experts using differing knowledge (Tichy, 2004). Through this useful tool 
the participants are alerted to the complexity of presented issues and they are urged to 
think and challenge their assumptions. The aerospace and defence environment is very 
fragmented, fractioned by disciplines, plagued by a polyglot technical language. 
polymorphic in its organizational structure, organized in bureaucratic lines and it is 
divided in authority and responsibility. Therefore the Decision Delphi we are using in 
the project is an attempt to deal with this crisis of ideas, alternatives, concepts and 
planning because our field is shaped by a mix of individual decisions rather by general 
rules of regularities. As "reality is not predicted or described; it is made" (Rauch. 
1973: 163) the participants in Delphi were recruited primarily with regard to their actual 
position in the decision-making hierarchy and in the second instance to their expertise. 
We believe that if developments are dominated by a multitude of independent and 
uncoordinated decision makers, a Decision Delphi is recommended to structure and co-
ordinate them towards a path to a desired future situation. 
This approach of selection can handle somehow the typical weakness of the 
Delphi method which is that insider's points of view are influenced by emotional 
investment, commitment or controllability. Experts are fascinated by their specific field 
tasks, the desirability of the outcome and they believe in their ability to influence. This 
optimism and overestimation often does not consider dependence on other technologies 
or need for organisational innovations as well as abilities to mobilise economics social 
and political resources to promote their goals (Bums, 1985). This is another one reason 
why we have chosen a non-homogeneous fair mixture of different grades of experts 
(from top experts to less knowledgeable) covering academia, public administration and 
business just to control elements of technological euphoria. 
Finally we admit that Delphi alone is not sufficient to overcome all problems. 
So the systems approach has been followed and complementary methods including 
scenarios have been used to enhance the reliability and the validity of results. 
66 
6.3 The Other Methods 
6.3.1 Documents 
Documentary evidence is defined as all printed sources and other non-\\Titten 
ones which illustrate the recorded impressions of certain people (Stanford, 1994: 146). 
As there are quite a few positive aspects of documentary evidence, they were used 
primarily when it was not possible to access key people. Alternatively it is a \en useful 
. . 
means to complement information already obtained by other methods, such as 
interviews and questionnaires. Being a flexible method, it allows questions to be formed 
via source material or the reading of relevant literature first and then the preparation of 
questions. Archival materials were also very useful. These included industry reports, 
internal documents such as newspapers and magazines articles about the firms as well 
as relative information available on the Internet. Other material produced by the MoD, 
the ED, the professional associations and the companies themselves - employee 
handbooks, marketing publications, press releases - have also served as data sources 
describing the work, processes and culture of the institutions. The choice of documents 
and the time required to go through them, remain the difficulties in documentary 
evidence (Ghauri and Grohaugh, 2002). Anyhow the researcher did not face particular 
problems with this and then followed the secondary sources, thus it was easier to 
classify findings according to their significance (Thornhill et aL 2003: 190-1). A \ery 
significant part of documents consisted of the 24 case studies of TF exercises developed 
by other countries all over the world (see Chapter 10). This collected knowledge and 
experience helped the researcher to avoid similar mistakes and follow some approaches 
which are considered as successful. 
6.3.2 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire is the second applied technique to collect data. The concern 
for designing these questionnaires was to remain \\"ithin the scope of the research plan 
so the questions should be not too many, too long or too short but simply written and 
accompanied by certain instructions when required. The Questionnaire I (Appendix 1) 
focused on the first and third aims of the research which were to locate the .\crL)space 
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and Defence technologies up to 2020 and to find out the dual-use products potential. 
The Questionnaire II (Appendix 2) examined the human factors integration into these 
high-technology systems which was the second aim of the dissertation. The main 
advantage of questionnaires is time gain even though it was not easy to prepare an 
adequate set of questions and to distribute it to 85 recipients (Oppentheim, 1966). The 
other advantage of this method is its lower cost. Of course there were difficulties. which 
were located in the structure of the questions themselves. After careful preparation it 
was possible to leave out impressions, vague assumptions. misleading wordings and 
sensitive issues too. An effort was also made to the general appearance of the 
questionnaire in order to be attractive to potential respondents who needed to ans\\-ef 
questions in due time and return the package (Moser and Kalton. 1971:267-268). 
Sending a questionnaire remains a faster approach than carrying out the same number of 
interviews, while the results were much better when the researcher / interviewer 
dispatched the questionnaire himself (Appendix 1) to responding people. These 
respondents, after the receipt of the questionnaire were given a certain time allowance to 
review the set of questions and then the researcher personally interviewed all of them as 
per the Delphi method described previously. All recipients of the questionnaire were 
then asked to answer questions and send back the completed document. That is why we 
inserted filter questions (Saunders et aI, 2003 :302) to assist the flow of the survey when 
respondents needed facilitation to reply. 
In this research the questionnaire included both types of questions. open and 
closed. The use of open questions permitted the interviewees to feel free to express their 
opinions more analytically. Closed or forced-choice questions were put to collect 
information efficiently over a specific subject. The closed-entered questions were of 
various types: list (yes/no or other item choices), category. ranking and rating. Analysis 
of questions was simple for list and category but more detailed for ranking and rating 
ones. Ranking questions did not exceed five items so respondents did not spend much 
effort. The Lickert-style rating scale was the approach used in rating questions \\'ith a 
five-point scale applied throughout the questionnaire to avoid confusing respondents 
(Dillman, 2000). Before starting the interviews - based on the previously s~nt 
questionnaire - the researcher carried out a pilot test to confirm the validity of the 
content. This trial run (Bell, 1999:218) helped our self-confidence because \\'e obtained 
a positive idea for the questionnaire's face validity. The questionnaire is considered a 
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rather complex tool so generally it was handled carefully because the more precise and 
tight it is the more comprehensible responses it gets (Webb, 1932:72). 
The questions were categorized in groups and emphasis was given to relating 
the answers and cross-checking them in order to increase their level of reliability. The 
first group of questions (1 to 6) pertained areas of innovation and corresponding 
perspectives in the next 20 years connected with societaL environmental and 
developmental issues. The next set of questions (7 to 15) covered the domain of R&D 
and associated benefits for Greece from Aerospace and Defence technologies. The third 
group (16 to 29) tried to extract data by asking questions on TF importance, the policy 
impact of it, the coordination of involved organizations and funding decisions of the 
political administration. The following eight questions (30 to 38) had to do with the 
profile of respondents, their clientele and the network of cooperation. The last grouping 
(39 to 47) examined the Greek Aerospace and Defence potential and its 
characteristics/constraints as well as how it is positioned versus European or world 
competition and what is the participants' view of the future policy for technology 
transfer approaches. 
6.3.3 Interviews 
The interview is the third part of the multi-method used in this research. 
Although the interviewer used the pattern of the said questionnaire, the schedule is not 
standardized and the interview is semi-structured following an open approach style 
(Cohen and Mahion, 1994). They were face-to-face interviews conducted on a one-to-
one basis. The semi-structured interview was used to help the qualitative character of 
the research as well as to explore and explain themes coming from the use of the 
questionnaire validating findings too (Healey and Rawlinson. 1994: 130). The staged 
approach has utilized in depth interviews to probe further responses having a fe\\ 
alternative questions as a back up for clarification (Lane and Roberts. 1971 :86). The 
interviews were not tape-recorded but notes were kept by the researcher. The intenie\\s 
fulfilled all three aims of the research as explained in the beginning of this Chapter. 
The long experience of the researcher (more than 35 years) in the field of 
Aerospace and Defence technologies enabled the collection of data during informal 
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observations made at the various installations visited (keeping notes of the e\eryday 
working environment or in cross-company meetings and some project group's brain 
storming sessions). 
6.3.4 Process and Implementation 
Even though no method is infallible, a multiple-source data is the best solution 
(Hakim, 2000). Practically the way this research was conducted, apart from the 
documentary evidence, was a combined approach of interview and questionnaire. That 
is the questionnaire was prepared and sent to key people just to give advance warning of 
the topics to be discussed; then, when both rounds of responses were received, a semi-
structured interview research was applied based on that questionnaire trying to get more 
information from a multistage convenience sample consisting of persons working at 
various private or state-owned companies, at universities. at research centers and in the 
public domain such as ministerial positions. An effort was made not to exceed fifty 
questions suitably prepared to obtain reliable and valid data about the issue of research. 
I was officially authorized to search relevant documentation and the assistance offered 
by the people involved is deeply appreciated. Moreover. interviewees were not tape-
recorded but verbatim transcribed, they were allowed to look at the drafted report, and 
this has built a mutual level of confidence. 
As part of the broader research agenda, interviewees were asked to comment on 
their experience in various programmes, the challenges dictated by the nature of their 
work and the ways used to sustain Foresight across different product categories and 
industry sectors (Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2005). This focus was adopted in order to 
understand how people aknowledge, experience and embrace the processes in\'olved in 
probing the future during their engagement in such a high-change industry. 
By using all these means, the applied methodology in this case study tried to 
combine a triangular scheme of the previously mentioned research techniques. Thus 
both aspects of quality and quantity were met following the classic argument of J. Bell 
(1999: 101). 
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"Case studies, which are generally considered to be qualitative studies, can 
combine a wide range of methods, including quantitative techniques. 
Methods are selected because they will provide the data you require to 
produce a complete piece of research". 
The method of data analysis drew on classical recommendations by Glaser and 
Strass (1967) as well as Miles and Huberman (1994). Search foresees that highlighted 
future trends were the specific task. Once several emerging categories were identified 
then the data were studied again seeking other fragments that fitted each category. Thus 
interaction between the data and the categories helped us in locating the most prominent 
categories. The methodology of this inductive approach is based mostly on unstructured 
analysis of qualitative data collected and open coding is the process used (Maylor and 
Blackmon, 2005). This was dictated partly by the thematic categories of technologies 
and the iterative way of classifying voluminous data from various sources. Validity of 
gathered information has passed a cross-checked verification through interviews and not 
been misled by particular influencies. Also vigorous analysis is ascertained by the 
concrete findings and conclusions so this enhances even more validity of the research. 
The continuous use of existing literature sharpened the insights yielded by the followed 
inductive process and linked the findings with existing concepts and relationships. The 
analysis of many case studies was an important advantage of our research and gave a 
more generalized character to the Technology Foresight review. The reason is that the 
acquired knowledge of the 24 case studies (See Chapter 1 O.l) permitted to form a 
thorough perception of the TF philosophy established worldwide through the 
development of national and regional Foresight programmes. Moreover the comparison 
of Greek TF with other South- European cases facilitated the results classification of 
this research. 
6.3.5 The dual role of the worker researcher 
During the preparation of this project my double role as a worker and 
researcher was very clear. I have chosen the combination of research methods and 
knowing their limitations I proposed to my fellow workers ways to apply this 
methodology effectively in order to get objective and practical outputs. Then I have 
. . (A d' 1 and 2) as well as I have conducted prepared both questIOnnaireS ppen Ices 
personally all the interviews. Moreover. as an insider. I had access in mam 
71 
documentary sources (either primary or secondary) because key people in different 
governmental or entrepreneurial positions have trusted my ethical understanding. It 
must be underlined here that the defence environment since it includes various critical 
and complex communities is not easy to penetrate unless you belong to it. That is 
maybe the reason that only UK and Greece so far have included in their TF exercises 
such an assessment on defence matters. 
In my case the results of the research were presented at the Working Group 
which has authorized the interdisciplinary analysis of the findings and the synthesis of 
texts. Of course I was always responsible as a team leader towards the Steering 
Committee. 
Moreover I went further of the initial TF project tasks and in this dissertation I 
covered the following three new areas by doing my own separate research. 
a. Technologies with wide applications (Chapter 5.5.2) 
b. Dual-use technologies (Chapter 8) 
c. Human Factors Interaction (Chapter 9) 
In addition I probed more in the Delphi research by completing a 3rd round of 
interviews confirming the already collected results. 
The deep knowledge of the questions to be researched and the structure of 
relative institutions in Greece have assisted my working practices during the whole 
research efforts. However sometimes I felt a slight influence of key people and of my 
personal expectations which was normal because of the duality of my roles. Anyhow. I 
admit that the market forces and the organizational culture did not have a serious impact 
on my objectivity as the professional experience itself had. 
In conclusion, the duality of my role as an employee and a researcher increased 
my reflexivity since I disposed the insight about the pure context of the project being 
also able to minimize any problems appearing during the research. 
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6.4 The Greek case 
The Delphi method has been used in Greek TF project. After selecting issues. 
as explained below, on Aerospace and Defence Technologies the following stages were 
involved for the application of the methodology (Haluk, 2002) 
o Generation of variables and topics (events/statements) 
o Selection of participants 
o Feedback of tendencies 
o Implementation of statements 
o Final analysis of results 
Due to time constraints our team had not the chance to implement further 
rounds. However the researcher, in the frame of this study, has completed a third Delphi 
round with an extended participants' list. The initial results were encouraging since this 
coincided and confirmed the outputs of the first TF report, as it will be analysed later. 
The WG of Aerospace and Defence has thoroughly studied the Joint Medium 
Term Armament Programme of MoD, the R&D projects of GDDIR (Appendix5), the 
technologies transferred to industries through Offset Benefits (Table 3) and the dual-use 
technologies developed by Greek firms (Appendix 6). Then the WG has selected the 
issues on which the questionnaire (Appendix 1) was based. 
In the Greek case the issues chosen (manufacturing, information society. 
economic restraints, European frame of directives/ perspectives, investments industrial 
defence priorities, human resources availability etc.) were not initiated from scratch and 
they were definitely interlinked. The experts have been asked to identify possible 
technological development in 20 years time as well as to estimate their occurrence and 
realization time. The advantage of complete anonymity did not apply in our case 
because the complete list of participants was announced except from some public 
servants who preferred not to reveal their names. Nevertheless during the whole 
sequence the panel members were not aware who has contributed in particular 
statements or assessments. The integration among involyed people \\as donc 10 
anonymous manner through the use of \Hitten questionnaires. HO\\c\er it must he 
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mentioned here that during the public presentation of our reports seyeral intenie\\ ~d 
experts appeared and supported their already expressed views. 
The Greek TF Delphi was designed as a Decision Delphi (Gordon. 1994). This 
specific form was considered as the most appropriate because the target was not just to 
forecast new emerging fields of Defence and Aerospace technology but also to map 
those fields and niches examining where Greece could attain a certain position within 
the next twenty years. 
6.5 Findings of Delphi 
The questionnaire was sent to 85 people in June 2003 and the response rate in 
the two rounds was high - 78 per cent and 89 per cent correspondingly - while the 
knowledge of the respondents was very good (as judged by the responses) and the 
answers were highly consistent. This is judged from the level or response rate which 
was calculated following Neumann (2000) ratio where the numbers of ineligible and 
unreachable persons were very low (about 5 to 10 per cent). Both Witmer (1999) and 
Willimack (2002) admit that a response rate higher than 60 per cent for questionnaire 
based surveys is quite satisfactory. The design of the Greek Delphi intended to have 
representatives of academia, business and administration (civil servants. customers - i.e. 
MoD officials - lobbyists etc.) roughly equally represented 75 per cent among the 
correspondents. These representatives were classified as experts taking into 
consideration their specific knowledge in the relevant field accepted by the scientific 
community with an influence on other actors in their domain (Bogner and Meyr. 2001). 
After the second round there were not significant differences in the shares. 
Functionally, almost 30 per cent worked in R&D. 20 per cent in market-related jobs. 20 
per cent were operators and users of Aerospace and Defence technologies while 10 per 
cent indicated a combination of several functions. The age structure could be considered 
as representative 22 per cent between 30 to 40 years old. 35 per cent between 40 to 50 
and 40 per cent above 50 years, but women were rather underrepresented since their 
participation hardly touched 5 per cent. 
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The participants were asked to indicate their specific knowledge usmg an 
ordinal five-point scale of integers (Lickert scale) as mentioned in research 
methodology. The state of the art (Cuhls et aL 1998) implies that all experts provide 
with a self-rating of one to three for respective questions. Again this was not collected 
by the questionnaire but it was covered through the personal interviews later on. The 
task of the participants was double: problem-oriented and future technologies 
development. Therefore the Working Group avoided the trap of focusing only on new 
technologies, urgently seeking just any application. Then the people had to comment on 
three hypotheses (the optimistic, the pessimistic and the conservative) pertaining three 
future scenarios as presented in Chapter 7. The discussion about scenarios was carried 
out during the personal meetings and the interviewees had to answer questions related to 
their specific knowledge, the innovativeness implied in the respective hypothesis. the 
importance of this hypothesis, its chance of realization in Greece and which policy 
measures were suitable to enforce the envisaged development. Within the TF project. 
the scenarios are understood as "possible future worlds" and not merely as desired 
and/or possible future states while in parallel they emphasize on the concept or 
knowledge society and on the way in which to approach and achieve this in connection 
with the various levels and fields under the TF exercise (Synthesis Report, 2005). 
However Cristensen and Raynor (2003) argue that the true effects of scenario planning 
and their hypotheses will not be known and will not become predictable until the 
phenomenon is examined rigorously in applied settings in which the circumstances of 
success and failure can be noted. 
The questionnaire was not long (Appendix 1) and this was a good reason for 
the high response rate. In total 21 per cent of the respondents indicated a very high 
knowledge and 32 per cent a high knowledge of Aerospace and Defence matters 83 per 
cent considered the scenarios hypotheses to be very important or important and 85 per 
cent as desirable. The description of foreseen Aerospace and Defence technologies was 
quite clear, there was a pessimism (22 per cent) for Greek technologies or economic 
dominance in realizing the relevant innovation but they have given good chances - 61 
per cent - with respect to social/organizational transposition. A good number of 
respondents supported that as innovation cannot be considered only solely technical but 
also organizational or even a mixed one. Another underlined point \\"as that they alsn 
distinguished three stages of innovativeness. The most advanced is "De\'eloped in 20 
years", the medium is "Available within 20 years" and the least innovative "In general 
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use within 25 years" (Tichy, 2004). It is emphasized that respondents' enthusiasm is 
more apparent for minor innovations than for major ones in the whole area of :-\erospace 
and Defence technologies. This could reflect the pessimism regarding Greek 
innovativeness. 
6.6 Some Conclusions and Suggestions 
Experts with the highest self-rating of their specific knowledge seemed to be 
the most optimistic among the respondents. Especially the top experts coming from the 
business sector are considered to give unjustified optimistic assessments in comparison 
with the less specialised business experts in the same field. Probably, some elements of 
technological euphoria and the belief in continuous technical progress have marked the 
view of these respondents. 
The over optimism of people working in business - to a large extent involved 
In R&D - is evidently consistent with the insider hypothesis because of the 
overestimation of the subjects the expert is working on (Weinstein, 1980). The same 
hypothesis may give satisfactory explanations for the over optimism between the 
experts in academia too, that in any case is weaker than in business. Anyway both as 
insiders have a predominately technical perspective (Kalinovski. 1994). 
A similar top-expert optimism was remarked with regard to the long-term 
realizations of new technological achievements while a relative pessimism prevailed for 
the short- and medium-term projects. Here, we could say that the time factor was not 
underestimated and the predictions were realistic. 
However the market over optimism among top-experts and insiders rings the 
bell that in TF exercises the panels must be based on a balanced mixture of experts from 
different backgrounds, types of knowledge/education and involvement/expertise not 
limited in top specialists of a unique field. The avoidance of homogeneolls 
characteristics in panelists and of high educational degrees offers a better contribution to 
accurate TF results on average. Other variables can also contribute. like using panelists 
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with a proven track record of similar experience in earlier efforts or by providing 
monetary or other personal incentives (Parente et aI, 1984). 
There was no time to apply an unstructured "zero round" offering the experts 
relative liberty and elaborate the issues they consider important (Martino, 1983). The 
thought is to follow this technique in the second generation Greek TF. Experience 
gathered during the first generation TF and study of other national TF showed that this 
familiarization phase is very useful for collecting valid data without losing valuable 
time for explanations. 
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7 
FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES 
The participants In Delphi survey were asked to propose certain future 
technologies in Aerospace and Defence for Greece - as required by TF sponsors -
which could be developed up to 2020. As mentioned in literature review (Chapter 3) the 
"resources based" approach of business strategy (Cariola and Rolfo, 2004) has directed 
the realistic location of emerged technology categories. The knowledge-based economy 
also favors the transition towards flexible production and inter-organizational systems 
(Schwartz et aI, 1999). Decentralization promotes regional development and some 
technologies and innovation ideas find fertile ground in certain areas in the periphery. 
Environmental issues and oil-dependent economy must find ways for new energy 
solutions. In parallel less transportation requires better communications and digital data 
transmission. All three scenarios planned (Chapter 5) demand autonomy in systems 
maintenance and self-defence ability. Uninhabited vehicles can limit many costs for 
human resources involvement. European Union defence and security framework on the 
other hand asks for certain Greek obligations (See Chapter 4) but we cannot abolish the 
existing serious defence infrastructure and innovation achievements. In conclusion after 
the research completion, the areas where Greece should focus in order to deploy 
affordable technologies up to 2020 are summarized as follows: 
1. Weapons, Ammunitions, Explosives 
2. Information Systems 
3. Energy Production and Storage 
4. Communications 
5. Sensors 
6. Unmanned Vehicles 
7. Maintenance Technologies 
8. New Materials 
The analysis below covers every area mentioned above giying specific details. 
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7.1 Weapons, Ammunitions, Explosives 
Greece has already been producing ammunition and explosives for more than 
100 years. The rule followed by almost all countries with strong Armed Forces is to stay 
autonomous, at least in common ammunition types. The Greek companies PYRKAL 
and Hellenic Arms Industry (EBO) - now merged in Hellenic Defence Systems -
require the corresponding technologies for battle and exercise ammunition of various 
calibres. Of course it is not cost-effective to maintain production lines for all types of 
ammunition therefore several of them are imported. 
The same applies to other weapons and missiles (air-to-air / ground-to-air / air-
to-surface / anti-armor), which are also imported limiting local participation in co-
production of some parts covering other international markets of the manufacturer. 
Therefore it is not possible to absorb all the relevant technologies for modem weapons 
by establishing respective production lines. Besides, the merger of the five bigger 
European armament producers (MATRA / British Dynamics / Alenia / Aerospatiale / 
BGT) as well in Russia (Antey / ALMAZ) and in USA (Raytheon / General Dynamics) 
shows that markets are shrinking (Janes, 2000). Again, as in major weapon systems 
(aircraft, ships, submarines, tanks) the modernization of missiles is the tendency 
worldwide. Therefore Greek companies (HAl, EDS. Intracom, Elfon. Olympic Tool), 
which have acquired the necessary technologies because of their participation in various 
missile procurements programs (Eurostinger, Hawk, Mica, Exocet, Milan etc.) could 
undertake such efforts to upgrade armament systems by investing relatively affordable 
amounts. 
Besides the above, there is a new section for the development of directed-
energy weapons (DEW) such as the high-power microwaves (HPM). the 
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or laser beams. International mobilization considers these 
technologies as future ones and some political efforts for a Greek compan~ about 
certain applications have been successful. 
An important domain is the destruction of obsolete ammunition and larger 
weapon systems because they have a life limit. The issues of safety and principally 
environmental protection are prevailing because of increasing ecological concern 
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expressed mainly by the European Union. Therefore methods for disposing of these 
toxic materials into the sea or at deep wells or canyons belong to the past. \ loreover. 
any controlled explosion for destruction purposes pollutes the atmosphere heavily and 
destroys the metallic parts, which could not be reused. A Greek company has designed 
and developed a new method which molecularly decomposes parts of ammunition, 
explosive or missile with fast and safe results. A significant advantage is the immediate 
recycling of materials (lead, copper, brass) including the phosphatic and nitric 
substances, which could be used immediately as fertilizers. 
In conclusion, the technologies, where reasonably low investments could be 
done by Greek entities (industrial or academic), are the following 
• New generation explosives 
1. Incentive 
2. Plastic 
• Directed-Energy Weapons 
1. Electromagnetic Pulse 
2. Ultra-Wide Band Pulse 
3. High-Power-Microwaves (Magnetron / Klystron / Traveling 
Wave Tubes) 
4. Radio frequency warheads 
5. Laser-directed energy 
6. Low-power laser 
• Advanced laser-protective technologies 
• Building design for safety against electromagnetic pulses 
7.2 Information Systems 
Information systems have a decisive role in data collecting. proccesing and 
.' h' h 'n turn .corm the areas of command control and intelligence. commUnICatIOns, w IC I 11 , 
vital for modem military operations. The key elements are computers. the associated 
software, fast data processing and transmission. together \\'ith the human machine 
interface. 
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Starting with computer technologies there are four which appear to be the most 
critical. First is the Application Specific Integration Circuits (ASIC), which \\ill haye a 
broad impact by reducing many characteristics of military systems (size. power. weight 
and cost) resulting to higher reliability. Wafer scale technology is linked with ASIC and 
gives also benefits to reliability by avoiding chip-to-chip bonding through monolithic or 
hybrid devices. Second in there are the terahertz electronics technology in conjunction 
with teraflop computers, which will provide improvement in speed (10 12 operations per 
second) and sensitivity. Thus these ultra-fast computers will dispose high orders of 
computational power for intelligence related processing and battle management 
systems. Last but not least are the thin-layer semiconductors which by using yarious 
techniques lead to extremely complex multilayer structures providing revolutionary 
properties. The resulting reduction in size and weight will have a positiYe impact on 
mobility, transportability and deployability of military systems (AGARD. 1997). 
Jumping to the development of software the offered capabilities are classified 
m battle management software (C2I, simulation / training, logistics, information 
warfare) battle control language, novel data management and manipulation, distributed 
processing, neural networks and synthetic environment. 
International competition, the Commercial-of-the-Self (COTS) equipment and 
the relatively limited Greek market does not allow investments in hardware production 
lines. However the domain of development of software and communication protocols 
could and should be realized by Greek companies and the academic environment. The 
aforementioned future software requirements and the overall idea of C4ISR (Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence. Surveillance and Reconnaissance) 
cover all relevant operational needs, which are voluminous and require multi-Ie\el 
process speeds. 
As the governmental services will be based on information technology \\hich 
operates mostly on commercial type systems, the issue of information warfare is 
becoming very serious. Possible attacks from hostile software (yirus. worms. trojan 
horses etc.), electromagnetic pulses, highjackers and so forth must be intercepted 
through a national strategy of security protection. Especially sensitiye targets like the 
Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Public Order. \\"hich \\ill be also obliged to apply 
. b'l't 1 s and should adopt the local and international scientific kno\\"ledge mteropera 1 1 Y ru e 
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by encouraging and supporting research efforts for developing electronic 
countermeasures and other types of safety instruments. 
Generally the mentioned areas below are the future techno I .. t og: III erests 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Interoperability of systems 
1. Automation of operational procedures and unceasing communication 
at all levels and situations (peace - conflict - war) 
Improvement of Information Command and Control 
1. Digital data transfer networks 
2. High-level data bases 
3. Electronic data mining and information filtering 
Electronic and information warfare countermeasures 
Crisis management analysis 
War games and simulation technologies 
1. Simulators of tactical plans and strategic philosophy 
2. Software for manpack military computers. 
7.3 Energy Production and Storage 
There is no sign that in coming years primary weapon systems will not be 
dependent on energy produced by fossil fuels to operate their engines (air, marine and 
land vehicles). Greece can only intervene in secondary systems energy requirements 
especially where there is a need for continuous operations in inaccessible areas. 
Current electronic systems have reached desirable levels of performance but 
they demand huge energy amounts for their function. Therefore Greek industries must 
be directed to the development of technologies securing the production and storage 0 f 
electrical energy (including high density power) for these systems. which \\ill be also 
designed as energy savers. Rechargeable or not rechargeable lightweight batteries of 
various capacities are vital for military missions. which require continuous power 
generation. Existing technologies are developing rapidly and the current needs of \ 100 
are covered partially from domestic industries. In paralleL enyironmental protection 
1,.) ., 
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imposes the use of alternative material for energy storage. The target is two-fold: firstly 
to apply technology to upgrade battery production capability and secondly to neutralize 
and recycle their materials after their lifecycle ends since they are toxic. Moreover. 
special concern is given to this ecological procedure by the European Union, which has 
established a strict legislation. The forecast is that in less than 10 years cost-effective 
ways would permit the recycling of the metallic parts of batteries as well as the 
inactivation of their chemical substances. 
Superconductivity is a means to decrease the electric resistance facing these 
problems of energy losses. The discovery of High Temperature Superconductivity 
(IEEE Spectrum, 2003) permitted the use of new materials where higher transition 
temperature needs only nitrogen and not expensive helium cooling. Therefore its 'use in 
power engineering technology and microelectronics allows the manufacturing of 
functional small-scaled electrical devices. 
As mentioned in the section on materials, after 2015 it would be possible to start 
using hybrid systems made of reusable parts providing high energy capacity and life 
endurance. This could be feasible with the contribution ofbio- and nanotechnology. 
The areas where Greek industrial policy should try to make efforts and 
investments are: 
a. Electric power generation technologies especially for future battlefield uses 
b. Storage and distribution of electric energy (new design of lightweight 
batteries and upgrading of existing ones) to be available at all times in all 
areas 
c. Renewable energies (solar, aeolic, biomass or sea waves) 
d. Fuelcells 
7.4 Communications 
Communications are the backbone for the interconnection of Armed Forccs. To 
send and receive information (voice, message/data, graphics/images, video) remains the 
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most vital aspect of crises and conflict management both in peace and \\-ar. There are 
two main categories: fixed (terrestrial) and wireless (radio) communications. The first 
helped by photonic/fibre-optic and signal-processing technologies can ha\e limitless 
capacity while the second based only on incremental technological breakthrough cannot 
expect any revolution for mobile equipment (RTO-MP-059, 2001). 
The mam developments of communications technology will be III the 
digitization of transmission and switching systems. The Integrated Services Digital 
Network (ISDN) is already trying to integrate all types of communications with very 
high data rates. Similarly, the Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) is a very critical 
step towards the standardization of transmission protocols and interfaces. In parallel. the 
sector of advanced satellite communications includes various technologies (fibre-optic, 
millimeter-wave, sensory access etc.) especially for long distance information 
distribution. Tactical communications (LF, HF, VHF, UHF, SIEHF) on the other hand 
will provide secure seamless battlefield data transfer improving military information 
capabilities offering better encryption and resistance to interference (Hellenic Army 
Research, 1999). 
In general, the exponential increase in the sector of commercial communications 
due to satellite and photonic networks will establish world spread-spectrum 
electromagnetic links. This defence environment has the challenge to absorb the 
availability of commercial aspects whilst maintaining high levels of security and 
protection through encryption and electronic countermeasures. The cryptographic 
techniques concerning national codes for both voice and data transfer can be developed 
in Greece and positive results have been shown by research institutes, universities and 
private companies. 
The main future communications technologies in titles appear below 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Semiconductor material and associated techniques (epitaxic or 
lithographic) for manufacturing of monolithic microwave integrated 
circuits (MMIC) 
Micron-sized vacuum of transistors 
Multi-gigahertz analog to digital converters (ADS) 
Optical digital systems (photonic/fibre-optic/light-wave) 
• Digital signal processing microprocessor chips 
• Super conductive microwave circuits 
Greek industries could not invest and compete foreign efforts already in 
development of these technologies. However, network management technology using 
multi -level security communication systems as well as command and control (C~ I) for 
the high-confidence handling of voice and all types of data is within the range of Greek 
manufacturers. The above mentioned technological breakthroughs could be imported 
and embedded in production lines of traditional radios and communication systems 
made by local companies. Another one recommendation is the specialization of each 
industry to specific areas of products (networks, optical equipment, radios etc.), which 
will prevent overlapping of sectors favoring thus the marketing effectiveness. 
Finally the proposed areas in communications development are summarized as 
1. All types of tactical radios (airborne, marine, vehicular, mobile etc.) for 
various applications and ranges using modem technologies for either 
line-of-sight (LOS) or non-LOS contact 
2. Design and manufacturing of alternate communication network for 
military, paramilitary (police, coast guard etc.) and other governmental 
use providing adequate security and protection 
3. Encryption methods and associated development of national codes and 
algorithms as well as preparation of required software, which will be 
integrated in respective locally manufactured equipment. 
7.5 Sensors 
Sensor technology is one of the technologies expected to playa major role in 
the future and it is a rapidly growing area of research with many products already on the 
market. Sensors span all sectors of industry and often offer innoyative products that lead 
to a competitive advantage. So knowledge about sensors and their future applications 
and development is important for a wide range of industrial domains in order to seize 
emerging opportunities (RTO-TR-072, 200~). 
The various types of sensory data (optical, infra-red. multispectraL tactile. 
acoustical, x-ray, laser radar, millimeter-wave radar etc.) will be used widely for man\ 
- . 
applications in this century: surveillance, reconnaissance, exploration, em'ironment 
monitoring, navigation, communication, command and control. The 2~-hour. all-
weather sensing capability is the key to achieve information dominance of dual-use for 
any conflict management or other civilian purpose. In general sensors will become more 
capable because of improved sensitivity, agility, resolution and automation 
requirements. 
It is interesting here to formulate a definition of sensors as a preliminary 
delimitation of the sensor technology domain (Andersen et aI, 2004). 
"Sensors and sensor systems perform a diversity of sensing .fimclions 
allowing the acquisition, capture, communication, processing and 
distribution of information about the states of physical systems. This 1I1(~r be 
chemical composition, texture and morphology, large-scale slruclure. 
position and also dynamics. It is a characteristic feature of a sensor that the 
device is tailored to the environment in which it is to operate ". 
The Greek contribution cannot be large for advanced sensors design and 
development to face anti-stealth or stealth technologies like passive or active measures 
to reduce the radar cross-section or the infra-red signature emission. However, there is 
much room for further development in areas like microwave radiometry. multi 
spectrallhyperspectral radars and ultra-wideband which can penetrate non-metallic 
surfaces such as dry soil, vegetation, shallow water or camouflage. These are results 
from a study performed by HAF research center KET A where MoD needs were 
matched with Greek capabilities in this domain (2001). 
Greek industries such as Hellenic Aerospace Industry. ECON and THEON 
have successfully produced certain types of optical sensors in the past decade 
integrating them also into existing weapon systems. Besides their design and 
manufacturing, the domain of sensors maintenance and support operates satisfactorily as 
well. 
Microwave radiometers can be developed for high-quality. short-range 
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imaging systems while multispectral or hyperspectral sensors for remote image sensing 
are not achievable in country. On the contrary, the area of distributed sensor s) stems 
where very large number of small and cheap sensors could work effectiyely replacing 
complex systems is feasible. THEON. a Greek firm specialized in sensors technology. 
has proved recently through a pilot effort that various types of inexpensiye sensors 
could be designed and produced without large amount of investments. Miniaturization 
techniques and development of algorithms for multi-source information correlation and 
fusion can be applied by Greek researchers. The management of combined inputs from 
a multi-sensory environment is critical. This data fusion from a variety of sources such 
as unmanned air vehicles, airborne or land radars, ships, submarines, surface and sub-
surface sound surveillance systems, different human sources, probes and weather 
stations must be accumulated and processed. The sensor signal processing and an 
automated data exploitation/classification/correlation are considered to be the most 
promising areas of Greek involvement. As development is not constrained to the 
military many commercial applications will also be boosted by this evolution, which 
will be supported by the expected increase in computer power and network 
communication bandwidth. It is known as the classification of sensors as per 
COMETMAN taxonomy: Chemical, Optical. Mechanical, Electrical. ThermaL 
Magnetic, Acoustic and Nuclear (McGhee et aI, 1999). 
The geographical dispersion of Greek islands and the extent of the country' s 
borders require a vast deployment of sensor capabilities combining border protection 
from enemy invasion, illegal immigrant entrance, drug trafficking, as well as the 
localization of shipwrecks or any environmental pollution (radio-biological or toxic). 
Other possible mixed applications include approaches to identification friend or foe 
systems (IFF), personal detection. location and protection of fires or earthquakes. An 
evolutionary performance again can be expected for monitoring damages, strain. 
temperature and generally reducing the requirement for reliability. availabilit) and 
maintainability in order to take most of them out of the loop. 
To conclude, sensor technology can be developed as follows 
• 
Every type of optical sensors (day or night yision) for ohscrvation 
and surveillance 
• Opto-electronics targeting systems 
• Environmental protection (atmosphere, marine and terrestrial 
applications) for detection and monitoring of hazardous 
substances 
• 
• 
• 
Sensor network management and development of algorithms 
Embedded fibre-optics 
Self-defense of weapon systems (Army. Navy. Air Force) 
7.6 Unmanned Vehicles 
The unmanned vehicles either Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UA V), Unmanned 
Underwater Vehicles (UUV) or Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) will continue to 
evolve becoming quite valuable in various roles: reconnaissance, surveillance. 
communications, electronic counter or suppression measures, anti-submarine warfare. 
air defence, strike mission of any kind on hunting and sweeping (RTO-EN-025, 2002). 
This evolution will happen because of developments in two main areas. the 
miniaturization and the long-range/long-autonomy technologies. In particular. the 
UAVs will be able to stay aloft for many hours - the target is for many days and 2.f-
hours a day - without any support from exposed personnel and associated equipment. 
These UA V s having different levels of stealth and a small size will provide low-level 
observation ability while requiring high costs for interception and destruction by the 
enemy. Their electric propulsion (novel batteries or solar cell technologies) and the 
advanced materials would make unmanned vehicles affordable for a variety' of low-cost 
and low-risk missions (ibid). 
The contribution of these remotely piloted systems to ciyil applications can 
compensate their development cost for the original designed military mission. Their 
versatility could serve a lot of purposes such as environmental studies and protection. 
border patrol, drug interdiction, agricultural or archaeological suryeys. rescuing people 
or hauling wreckages. destruction of land I sea mines or any other kind of explosi\cs. 
surveillance support for natural disasters and smuggling suppression. By changing the 
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payload accordingly these systems could easily become multi-mission and flexible 
platforms with sustainable capabilities. 
The Hellenic Air Force Research Center (KETA) has successfully designed and 
manufactured the first UAV fifteen years ago for reconnaissance purposes. Later on 
Hellenic Aerospace Industry proceeded in the preparation of TELAMON UAV in 
cooperation with Northrop Aviation (HAl presentation, 1998). These initial efforts 
proved the local capabilities but they were not backed up by further decisions so 
valuable time was lost. Afterwards the Engineering Corps of HAF made another brave 
effort and created a small remotely piloted airplane named PEGASUS. for short-range 
surveillance. This local achievement remained in stagnation until Hellenic Armv 
imported two French UAVs for information management missions. 
All unmanned vehicles are robots of a certain complexity for dangerous 
missions protecting and replacing specialized and skilful personnel successfully and 
cost-effectively. In the case where a large number of inexpensive vehicles is required, 
the respective production line is affordable in-country. Apart from the public services a 
few companies already operate this type of vehicles providing outsourcing services. 
The technologies, which could be developed III Greece for all kinds of 
unmanned vehicles, are concentrated as follows 
• Aeronautical and structural design 
• Ro botic technologies 
• Command and control of autonomous missions 
• Automatic control 
• Secure communications 
• Multi-spectral sensors able to absorb and process data. 
7.7 Maintenance Technologies 
The European Union is about to finalize the central policy for defence and 
security within state members (Papantoniou. 2003). In vie\v of this announcement the 
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significance of maintenance for high-technology systems is apparent smc~ it IS 
characterized by an extended techno-economical interest. For instance, Greece could be 
authorized to support and exclusively maintain certain types of European defence 
systems and this share might be quite considerable. In parallel, other countries could 
undertake their shares according to their capabilities and size. At a national 1~\~1. the 
Hellenic Aerospace Industry and Hellenic Shipyards have been handling such 
programmes both domestically and internationally with great success. It should be 
mentioned here that design and production of a new aircraft (fighter, trainer. transport) 
is a very costly and time-consuming process, also framed by limited governmental 
budgets. The same applies for ships and submarines. Therefore the new international 
trend is to keep the original weapons platform (airplane, ship or armored vehicle) and to 
upgrade the functional systems on it (electronics. armament, electrical or hydraulic 
subgroups, engines, self-protection devices etc.) (AGARD, 1997). 
This approach is directly linked with maintenance activities. Fighter aircraft 
need specific inspection of their structural integrity because of the accumulated fatigue 
during combat missions and flights in adverse weather conditions. Hellenic Aerospace 
Industry (HAl) has established a very fruitful cooperation in defence with Middle East 
and other Mediterranean Countries (HAl Bulletin. 2001). It is noted that the acquisition 
cost of a military airplane equals the maintenance expenses during a period of eight (8) 
years. HAl's capabilities have attracted the attention of original equipment 
manufactures in the western world who desire to participate in the associated 
maintenance works (HAl BoD, 2005). 
Respective defence industries in eastern countries (i.e. ex-communist) are eager 
to maintain high-technology weapon systems especially airplanes (Sukhoi, Tupole\', 
Yakovlev, Antonov, MiG, Ilioushin) (Luftwaffe, 2004) but they do not possess the 
infrastructure and the financial resources to invest in this. Thus HAl and other Greek 
Companies would benefit a lot from undertaking similar projects. Firstly. there is the 
acquisition of so far inaccessible technologies at a considerable profit and secondly 
there is the increase in turnover and international clientele. Over and abmc these 
obvious benefits, is the extra political advantage for Greece to operate as an aviation 
center between two hemispheres. 
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Dual-purpose aeronautical technologies also cover the field of passenger 
airplanes and aero engines which also includes smaller airplanes (general ayiation. VIP. 
aeroclubs etc.) requiring much less of a respective infrastructure. The new .~thens 
airport operates as a hub of international flights, which facilitates civil airplanes to land 
on HAl's airport (Tanagra air base) to undertake all necessary maintenance on site. 
The same applies to marine technologies, which are found in traditional Greek 
shipyards with the know-how at all levels. Distribution of sea vessels according to their 
missions is a very cost effective idea in order to economize resources (Nikitakos. 
Tzannatos, 2003). For instance, Skaramangas shipyards (Hellenic Shipyards) could 
support frigates and submarines while Elefsis could host corvettes, petrol carriers or 
destroyers while Neorion mine sweepers, patrol boats and cargo ships. The privatization 
of these companies has assisted in competition permitting multiple advantages. 
Moreover, existing installations after a careful modernization in areas such as anti-
corrosion technologies, surface chemical treatment and international quality control 
standards (ISO, Six Sigma etc.) could absorb all domestic naval maintenance needs. 
These needs include not only Hellenic Navy and Coast Guard vessels but mainly the 
demand of the Greek commercial fleet which is the largest worldwide. 
In summary, the present and future technologies covering the maintenance 
requirements of defence / civil airborne and sea vehicles are proposed as follows: 
• Non-destructive inspections 
• Software development for automatic operational control 
• Quality assurance according to international standards 
• Metallographic analyses 
• Composite materials manufacturing 
• Chemical surface treatments (Air Plasma, Spray. high Caducity 
and Oxygen Fuel) 
• Computer aided design and manufacturing 
• Engine test cells of various capacities 
• Preventive engine maintainability 
• Monitoring of aircraft structural integrity 
• Supply chain management using smart labels 
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• 
• 
New electronic material design and tests (surface mount 
technology, electromagnetic interference and compatibility etc.) 
Metrology and calibration of test equipments 
7.8 New Materials 
In spite of defining broad fields as panel topics to be analyzed, a strong 
emphasis was put by the Steering Committee on the so-called cross-cutting issues. 
Therefore our WG was encouraged to identify and adequately deal with these issues 
when analyzing major trends and developing alternative visions for the Aerospace and 
Defence Technologies. Areas like Energy, Air Transportation, Environment. New 
Materials, Information and Communications are falling into these categories. We have 
chosen the New Materials sector as the most precise technology-wise to be examined. 
Although they had prepared a complete thematic report we specified some technologies 
which are common with Aerospace and Defence ones. Therefore bilateral meetings 
were organized among respective WG members for close collaboration in defining 
interdisciplinary technological issues. This should be considered as a first approach so 
more systematic efforts accompanied by sophisticated methods are required to deal with 
these cross-cutting issues. Moreover, there is an obvious need to find appropriate -
efficient, convincing - ways and means to convey these messages to decision makers 
and opinion leaders. 
There are two categories here which cover this domain. Basic materials and the 
manufacturing of high technology systems. 
7.S.1 Basic Materials 
Materials are a key technology in achieving high performance for virtually all 
products. While performance improvements, such as high-temperature mechanical 
properties, should be the primary push, affordability also has to be included for the 
beginning in R&D goals. There are three main categories of traditional and advanced 
material which are used in Aerospace and Defence. 
• Metals 
• Ceramics 
• Composites 
• Operational Applications 
TF Materials Report contains a SWOT analysis (pp.48-51) presenting the 
situation in Greece for the above materials. 
More precisely for steels (soft and special) and aluminum alloys (Ti-Al, Ni-AI) 
it is recommended to invest in R&D for better production, methods and quality 
products. Concerning advanced ceramics, there is no competitive advantage and an 
extensive investment in this field is not cost-effective because it is very stricted by 
environmental limitations. On the contrary_ composites and high-performance carbon 
fibres have a future and some small or medium-sized enterprises (SME)_ including 
Hellenic Aerospace Industry, could be engaged in the production and manufacturing of 
such items on condition of being able to ensure considerable volume. The anticipated 
increase of composite material needs will be five times higher up to 2020 because there 
is a trend to substitute traditional material (AI or St) in all structures demanding high 
resistance and light weight. Multifunctional composite materials are even more 
attractive since applications cover a much broader area than pure aeronautical. This 
domain has attracted a research interest from Greek SMEs and Universities while there 
is a potential in EU - funded research programmes. 
The last category of Operational Materials includes uses in microelectronics. 
nanotechnology and other microsystems in general. Results from a recent conference 
(Democritus, 1999) have shown that Greek institutions have great research capabilities_ 
patents, know-how and a significant human capital specialized in this field. Magnetic 
materials also belong in this category (permanent magnets - sinderedfplastic bonded. 
magnetic sensors, magneto-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) etc.). 
7.8.2 Manufacturing 
Manufacturing technology and quality are an integral part of materials and 
structures R&D and an integrated approach here results in affordable technolog) for 
improved products. 
In Greece we could concentrate in the following areas in order to be In a 
competive position near the target year of2020. 
• On-site welding techniques for aeronautical structures (i.e. laser or 
friction) 
• Aircraft light surfaces (composites with V, Mg, Ti alloys) 
• Internal combustion engines parts (reaction synthesis in Si ceramic) 
• Energy production and storage (ceramics treatment) 
• Health monitoring of structures 
• Defect detection (non-destructive tests) 
• Process monitoring 
Manufacturing can also play a significant role in energy and natural sources 
consumption which is a vital parameter for Greek economy and autonomy. Many 
thermal processes currently use very inefficient heating methods. The rising cost of oil 
imposes R&D for new methods. Technologies covering automated thermoset and 
thermoplastic composite processing for Aerospace and Defence products need to be 
developed further. It is within Greek capabilities to evolve some of these technologies 
in view of energy conservation 
• Fibre placement 
• Thermoforming 
• Compression and injection molding 
• Automated ply lamination, joining (diffusion bonding) and handling 
• Net shape manufacturing for metals and metal-matrix composites 
(casting, spray casting, extrusion, forging. superplastic forming. pO\\ der 
metallurgy etc.). 
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8 
DUAL TECHNOLOGIES 
8.1 Introduction 
A considerable effort was devoted to this research and as extension to the TF 
project towards the examination of interrelationship between military and ci\'il 
technologies. This is a very old issue already researched by many western countries 
simply for economic reasons (Rappert, 1999). After the fall of communism many 
eastern countries, especially Russia, tried to convert a significant part of their defence 
industries to the production of civil equipment but the results are still not very 
encouraging. This is not only due to mere conversion difficulties but to other factors 
too, such as the general economy, non-competitive products, old manufacturing 
procedures and the lack of trained personnel with new skills (Solovey, 2001). 
The term dual technologies is commonly used to describe technologies that are 
developed and utilized by both the military and the civilian sectors. As Smit (1995) 
maintains it is not possible to characterize technologies as military or as civilian or 
sometimes as a mixture of both. Only through their usage or development can they be 
classified. An example in Greece is the maintenance of military and civil aeroplanes. 
Hellenic Aerospace Industry already supports the maintenance requirements of the 
Armed Forces (Air Force, Army, Navy) and of some other private aircraft. However. it 
has failed to undertake the responsibility for another state-owned company. Olympic 
Airways, because the social network of the respective air transport technologies is 
different. The prevailing mentality and operational requirement differ in respecti \e 
ministries and working environment, as well as international rules and standards for the 
airlines, which has prevented such cooperation, in spite of the obvious cost 
effectiveness of joint efforts. 
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The "dual-use policies" is a response to problems which arose because of the 
following three facts. The first is the dramatic reduction in defence budgets in :\:-\ TO 
countries touching a 40 per cent between 1988 and 2003 (Molas-Gallart. 1997). The 
second is the growing cost of developing a new weapon system. As it \\-as proved 
(Augustine Laws, 1988) the cost covering all the phases of a fighter or bomber aircraft 
preparation (from the design office to the production line) increases 400 per cent e\en 
decade. The corresponding cost increase for land or sea vehicles (battle tanks, ships, 
submarines) is 200 per cent for the same period of ten years. The third is that the 
relationship between defence and civilian technologies has changed, following a re\'erse 
path. Today the rapid growth of civilian technologies feeds the development of the 
military equipment while during the past century and especially its second half defence 
technologies have borrowed civil applications such as aerospace and computers 
(AGARD, 1997). 
These three facts have compelled corresponding trends, therefore the 
manufacturers involved in defence business are having to adapt themselves. New 
technologies, new processes and new mechanisms must be developed to exploit broader 
markets and to face new challenges. Hence dual-use technologies are important and in 
addition the commercialization of products with dual-use potential are the main issue. 
As Molas-Gallart (2001) comments technology must be considered lying between mere 
artifacts and the system of social relations where these artifacts are developed and 
produced. In any case the meaning of the Greek word technology (techni + logos) is 
exactly this and the definition by Autio and Laamanen (1997 p.647) reflects it. 
.. Technology comprises the ability to recognize technical problems, the 
ability to develop new concepts and tangible solutions to technical problems 
and the ability to exploit the concepts and tangibles in an effective lray. .. 
Since technology includes different kinds of knowledge (tacit and skills) 
together with various processes involved for the production of deliverables as well as 
software, capital equipment, blueprints and managerial abilities then all these are 
applicable to dual-purpose technologies. Thus they can be used both for military 
purposes and important civilian ends without discrimination. Howe\,er the term "dual-
use" cannot be precise because military and civilian technologies are not clearly defined 
as contrasting each other. In addition, many military products possess \mious degrees 
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of similarity with civilian goods and several general technologies can be applied 
without distinction to both military and civilian developments at the same time. 
Here the term "technology puch-over" applies introduced by Klein (2001) 
meaning that advanced defence technologies shift over to civilian sector looking for 
corresponding applications. This happens when the defence budget downturns so there 
is political pressure for counter-cyclical technology spending in other sectors 
(transportation, medical engineering, telecommunications, information technology. 
automation etc.). The so called "iron triangle" consisting of industrial forces, defence 
agencies and politicians (Gordon 1981, Adams 1984) press towards this cyclic 
movement from defence to civil and vice-versa according to Ministry of Defence 
budgetary cutbacks and surges. The simple reason for this is that combined spending in 
two sectors is more stable than either one alone12. 
A very good example for consideration of this are the maintenance technologies 
described in Chapter 3, for marine and aerospace cases in the private or the public 
sector. Of course there are no strict rules for the dual-use technology transfer 
mechanism from one side to the other due to the diversity of this dual-use potential. 
8.2 Dual-use Technology Management 
The state-owned Hellenic Shipyards moved into production of civilian items for 
the first time in 1995, when military orders faced a decline. they were awarded the 
construction of train wagons for the National Railways Organization (MoE, 2000). 
Today after ten years there is still a debate because of the long delay in deli\'eries of 
these products. This emphasizes the view that the transition through dual-use 
technologies is not easy even if the market is sheltered. 
12 It must be noted that a dual-use technology can be transferred within and across units without an) 
intention to chancre its application. For example a company may sell ~ licence for a cO~1ponent to another 
firm that intends ~o use this technology for the same military a~plicatlOn. Thus a tr~~.ster \\ as done acro~s 
economic units but not across purposes and this is not conSIdered as a case ot dual-use technolo~) 
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The transfer of dual-purpose technologies can be done either externally across 
units (i.e. from research centers to industry) or internally within the same business unit. 
The definition characterizing this transfer could be 
"A special instance of technology transfer across application that takes 
place when a dual-use technology developed for a military (or civilian) use is 
transferred to a civilian (or military) application" (Molas-Gallart) 
Principally the dual-use technology transfer policy covers the case when there is 
a desire to modify the initial application of a technology. During this research we ha\e 
perceived two instances of such diversifications. One was the Hellenic Arms Industry, 
which decided to modify the production line of guns to produce rifles for hunting and 
the PYRKAL ammunition producers who opened a new production line for all 
ammunitions covering hunting purposes. The last year (2004) these two companies have 
merged in a new one under the name Hellenic Defence Systems. 
Hopefully in Greece there will not be an effort from a relatively big state-owned 
defence company to shift into the development of the commercial market because it 
would suffer from the common problems of large defence projects, which are 
summarized in high cost, late delivery times and poor quality control. The steps towards 
the diversification of production are very careful and concern certain specific products 
for in-country consumption avoiding risky generalization. In parallel, smaller 
companies have found the dual-technology ground comparatively easier since they are 
more flexible as they operate upstream in the defence markets by producing components 
or sub-systems and they undertake subcontracting jobs1\Kollias and Rafailidis, 2003). 
The opposite direction for technology transfer, from civilian to military 
operation, has not been very successful practically and it is limited to some research 
activities proposed from the academic environment to the Ministry of Defence for 
covering special needs or they still belong to the sector of emerging technologies. The 
case of the company Soukos Robots should be mentioned at this point. which has 
applied high frequency molecular decomposition for the old ammunition (Company' s 
Profile, 2003). This material has passed the life-limit and is no longer useful. therefore it 
L1 Greece examines the case to enable industry to access the skills and facilities in the. defence res~arch 
environments. MoD studies the examples of UK and Australia where select~d tech~ologles are transkrred 
as spin-offs to industry through licensing. The target is applications to be dIrected In commercIal markets 
to enchance local industry efforts. 9S 
must be destroyed because it is dangerous and useless. The applied practice 
internationally is to throw it into the sea or into deep canyons, which is a \\aste of 
material and worse a very anti-ecological approach. This Greek company by the speed~ 
decomposition of the ammunition separately collects the metals (lead and bronze) and 
the chemical substances (phosphate and nitric unions). which can be recycled easily 
even as fertilizer pellets for agricultural purposes. The same technique has been used for 
some other military or paramilitary applications such as neutralization of land mines 
and the destruction of bombs and similar terrorist weapons without any risk for 
personnel. 
However there are some other cases of civil-military integration where defence 
and civilian products are prepared in the same facilities. This is the example of crypto 
devices produced up to a certain level in Intracom (Troullinos interview. 2003). Some 
of them are directed to the Armed Forces incorporating ad hoc algorithms and electronic 
countermeasures while the rest have private clients who desire protection of their 
communications (by telephone and facsimile) as a destination. 
8.3 Technology transfer 
During this research special attention was paid to the ways used for the dual-
technology transfer, but at the same time taking into account the parameters influencing 
the Greek business environment. 
The first category was the absorption of technologies within the same industrial 
corporations, which is the case for many Greek business units. This transfer of dual-use 
technologies in most cases require adaptation and modification of processes because 
either the integration of military and civilian production lines will occur or a conyersion 
with associated substantial organisational changes. Alternatively diversification policies 
can be applied or apart from these horizontal changes a vertical repositioning policy \\ill 
drastically relocate the unit from its original direction (Cowan and Foray, 1995). 
Besides these conventional \yays towards the exploitation of emerging 
technologies we have also examined approaches to transferring dual-use technologies 
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not internally but externally. Although this is considered as non-conventional in Greek 
standards it is something, which has been exercised for many years abroad. The idea of 
external transfer involves the creation of an institution-governmental or semi-
governmental - which will transfer the technologies developed in defence research 
centers to interested parties under certain contracts of licensing. This agency will be 
supported by the MoD and acting as a broker or facilitator will improve the 
communications connecting sellers and buyers of available technologies. 
Of course special attention will be paid to the necessary tacit knowledge of the 
technology developers, which cannot be simply transferred as the prototypes or the 
design data packages of the units. The debate about the tacit versus codification of 
knowledge has firm arguments because organizational learning does not follow a linear 
but a spiral evolution during which tacit knowledge is transformed into codified 
knowledge (Sefrati, 1999). Sometimes this movement is reversed when new kinds of 
tacit knowledge arise and interact with the new kinds of codified knowledge (Freeman, 
Soete, 1997). In any case the technical complexity of modem weapon systems is 
protected mainly by tacit knowledge for national security reasons. Nothing prevents the 
creation of a technology transfer office within other state research laboratories in 
universities or ministries, which could establish its own mechanism to commercialise 
and disseminate research outputs. These active methods will naturally be accompanied 
by the passive ones including participation, reports, studies, that at a certain level are 
realized by the General Secretariat of R&D. Going further, private companies and 
especially industries belonging to the government, should not exclude the renting out of 
the facilities to commercial firms which are in a need of fixed capital facilities. Hence 
the gain is double by compensating the decline of defence budget and by keeping ali\'e 
installations ready to reactivate if there is a future need. 
Governmental officials face this approach positively, as well as pri\ate 
entrepreneurs who incur a lot of start-up costs when they want to launch their 
operations. Nonetheless, the idea of a creation of a new specific research centre to 
develop a dual-use technology center seems somehow luxurious for such a purpose 
exclusively. This can be realised by GDDIR under the auspices of the joint Defence 
Research Center. which will coordinate the dual potential of industrial, academic and 
other governmental departments driving it according to different market requirements. 
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The possibility of establishing new spin-off companies. belongs to the 
extemalization of dual-purpose technologies which could promote new ideas. Former 
employees of defence related companies and public laboratories haye already created 
such Greek firms (no more than fifteen in twenty five years) (GSRT, 2001) in order to 
commercialise ideas developed during their research. At this time the ground is 
considered fertile because European Union programmes together with nationally backed 
projects of Ministry of Development are encouraging similar efforts by groups of 
scientists. The General Director of GDDIR was ready to provide a decent portion of the 
100 mi € yearly budget to assist people who are trying to promote dual-use technologies 
development seriously. 
8.4 Proposal of Studies 
This research also revealed that there should be a study of a conceptual 
framework which will contain the characteristics of military and civilian systems and 
the description of the following data necessary for further analysis. 
a. Classification 
The main products need to be classified in order to demonstrate the similarities 
and differences between military and civilian. This classification would also identify the 
products that are identical in civilian and military context as well as others that are 
principally military. 
b. Markets 
The types of markets which exist in the civil and military field are important for 
the sales promotion of products. 
101 
c. Structural Analysis of Systems 
The high relationship between structures for both military and ciyilian larg~ 
systems such as communications, will enhance our understanding for the integration of 
total purpose technologies. 
d. Generic Technologies 
Innovation in generic technologies used at military and civilian systems shapes 
a critical path for judgment of their future common development. 
e. Common Languages 
Specific terms and definitions vocabulary must be agreed upon in order to use a 
common language and not overloaded general terms (i.e. technology, system). 
8.5 Cost Consideration 
As costs of individual weapon systems increase continuously and available 
national funds are being cut back, the only solution is to buy fewer systems every year. 
Therefore economies of scale cannot be materialized because a production line tends to 
be very small. In addition, a high overhead burden is also added, which comprises the 
administrative charges (management cost, reports, financial accountability etc.). 
Concerning production, this remains labour-intensive although automation has been 
applied. In spite of reducing the number of production workers extra people are 
involved (i.e. engineers) increasing thus other labour costs. 
Performance maximization, regardless of cost raIse the final pnce of the 
system and productivity maintains a secondary role. Another important factor in cost 
increases is that development and production of these high-performance defence 
systems have been assigned to one company because of the small quantities. Therefore 
lack of competition does not favor cost saving through yarious efforts of the contractors. 
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Military specifications govern defence products and processes, so expensi\c 
special requirements do not permit commercial parts with similar performance and 
much less procurement costs to be used. Moreover, production processes (i.e. welding. 
surface treatment, quality assessment etc.) cannot be substituted by their commercial 
equivalents again losing opportunities for economies of scale. 
The military-industrial complex, on the other hand, drives military programmes 
and defence budgets since the vicious circle works between the defence-oriented firms. 
which are totally dependent on MoD for business and which in tum depends on them 
for goods and services. This interrelationship continues when the MoD requires a 
number of items rapidly because of a certain political crisis, so the only way is to 
maintain excess capacity (plants, equipment and labour), which is not at all affordable. 
However, this is the only way to obtain critical output since there is no connection with 
the commercial sector. 
Many of the above-mentioned cost items are not met in the Greek environment 
except in the case of the two large state-owned companies - Hellenic Aerospace 
Industry and Hellenic Defence Systems - after the privatization wave realized a few 
years ago. 
8.6 Integration Benefits 
Military and civilian technologies integration provide substantial benefits first 
for defence and second for the civilian economy. This research has shown that 
interviewees agreed on the following: 
1. Any possible counter-cyclical reaction of both economies assures labour 
stability and more efficient industrial output. 
2. Sole-source defence contractors will give their place to commercial firms 
allowing continuous competition and cost-effectiye results for Am1ed 
Forces. Similarly the mutual interdependence of the military-industrial 
complex will be dramatically decreased \yith the broadening of the 
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suppliers' base for defence contracting. Therefore political decisions \\-ill 
be replaced by economical and operational tasks. 
3. Adaptation of commercial practices will permit design-to-cost 
engineering, stricter quality control, reduced management structure and 
economies of scales where applicable. Moreover, an abandonment of 
costly choices will start because the designers will become more cost 
conscious the more they get involved in broad commercial opportunities. 
4. Access to the MoD R&D budget will encourage the commercial v"orId to 
participate in long-term, high-risk developments although they are 
accustomed to short-term results. 
8.7 Implementation 
In order the Greek defence-oriented and commercially-oriented firms to benefit 
the most from conversion and integration, they must avoid the errors of the past already 
made by other countries of a higher industrial level and with bigger defence budgets. 
The next are some suggestions towards this implementation. 
• It is not easy for an old structure to absorb new technologies and 
changeover so there should be an adaptation phase, which includes the 
initial planning time, to match the recipients characteristics. 
• The government be the first buyer and the civilian sectors will follow for 
any output of integration because this action will stimulate common 
efforts. 
• The principal assets, which should be maximized in spite of any 
conversion difficulties, are the capital equipment production labour forces 
together with skillful management and engineering innovation. 
• Priority should be given to converted commercial products. \\hich will 
substitute imported ones for obvious economic attracti\'eness and political 
impact. 
• 
Effective technology transfer happens mainly through the workforce 
cooperation. Thus human resources must accept changes which \\ill be 
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either a significant reduction of personnel or reconstitution of the top 
management by using key people with civilian experience. 
8.8 Conclusions 
It seems that military procurement needs will move towards stagnation while the 
commercial markets will follow a continuous growth. Apart from stagnant military sales 
some additional factors like choking purchasing processes and the longer life of 
weapons systems (i.e. about 30 years for a fighter plane or 50 for a cargo aircraft) do not 
assist the advancement of R&D for defence technology. Of course Greece cannot think 
of developing complex weapon systems but instead the local industry will participate in 
the development of their sub-systems or of some components. Furthermore, if these are 
generic items adapted from or which could be adapted to civilian use, then there is an 
interesting field for in-country productivity over the next decades. The MoD/GDDIR 
together with Organization of Industrial Patents are willing to support these perspectives 
of technology exchange between defence researchers and potential civilian buyers by 
taking care of this codified knowledge (patents, blueprints. designs etc.). Moreover a 
proper use of human resources capital will preserve the tacit knowledge embodied in 
them as skills and '"know-how" assets. The necessary fixed capital, which pertains to all 
the production and research facilities can be also adapted and diversified for the creation 
of dual-use production. Governmental agencies should attempt to blunt the differences 
between the technological and marketing cultures evolved during the thirty years of the 
Greek defence industries existence. Straight dual-use technology transfer mechanisms 
may have visible and short term results but the long term requirements of defence 
technology and production face important problems. Since the higher unit cost of 
defence products cannot ensure sustainable production, a civil-military technological 
integration is the better reaction. 
We proposed that MoD officials lower the wall of separation of military and 
civilian activities and develop ways, through the use of universal tools. in the 
operational practices of defence firms and laboratories. Another proposal. which was 
accepted, was the reform of the defence procurement lm\ which was compktely 
1()~ 
modified during the last year and it IS ready to be submitted for parliamentary 
discussions (revised law No 284/98). 
European industrial integration between military and commercial actiyities is 
encouraged by the common defence policy. In so far as the size of US market and the 
superiority of US defence giants which oblige European firms to search transatlantic 
cooperation, it is well promoted by member states governments. The internalization 
process of US industry is not acceptable to the Europeans who in contrast favor defence 
globalization through trading, opening of bids to foreign competitors or outsourcing 
technologies via Offset Benefits. This process cannot be firm-centered since national 
governments have a decisive role to play and Greece undoubtedly believes in this policy 
(See Chapter 3). 
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9 
HUMAN FACTORS IN AEROSPACE 
AND DEFENCE 
9.1 Introduction 
Another domain, which was researched individually after the completion of the 
TF exercise is the area of Human Factors (HF). The reason for this is that Greece has 
not been following so far any HF research policy or strategy to guide the initiation of 
proper activities as directives for the country' s defence and aerospace industries. 
Consequently if we want to present future Aerospace and Defence technologies and 
propose them as a national focus for 2020. personnel and equipment cannot be 
separated. It is the interaction of people and equipment and/or systems, which produce 
capability for development (DTIIDAS. 2001). Moreover Greek products and services 
offered to our European customers on a share-based cooperation - as already mentioned 
- must be governed by HF principles accepted internationally. The aim of this research 
was to map the situation of HF involvement during the design and manufacturing of 
high-technology products and to prioritize some areas of HF integration where 
necessary efforts and investments should be made. 
The broad definition of HF covers the professional discipline which concerns 
the improvement of human issues into the analysis design. development. 
implementation and operational use of systems (HF National Adyisory Committee. 
2002). The total knowledge supporting HF activities is the sum of various 
specializations including engineering, ergonomics and human physiology. The obyious 
branches of engineering involved are information technology. mechanical control and 
systems engineering. 
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The problem starts from the growmg complexity of technological systems 
which are an order of magnitude more complex than they were in the 1980s. Improyed 
understanding of the relationship between people and technology. the way the human 
brain processes and uses information and the socio-technical context in which people 
and organizations derive benefits from technology will all be needed to apply HF 
integration. There are two principal gaps here. One concerns the capability of 
technology and its ease of use and the other has to do with functionality and usefulness 
of systems. Additionally there are also two tendencies or trends. The first is to reduce 
public tolerance of organization risk the second is to reduce tolerance of social 
exclusions. In order to handle all these issues and find corresponding HF interfaces, this 
research focused on four general themes which are: 
• To bridge the gap between human intelligence and what people are 
trying to control whether it be data or equipment 
• To integrate, interpret and transform data into information and deliver it 
to those who need it and in a way which supports individual and group 
decision making and actions 
• To understand how technology changes individual and organizational 
behaviors and what is the impact of the numerous and complex factors 
on the relationship between people and technology. Humans as a 
component of socio-technical systems should use inherently safe 
products, services and methods of working which are not socially 
exclusive and do not create risk for anybody 
• Multi-cultural and multi-national operations reqUIre better 
understanding of the inter-personal, cultural and social issues for more 
effective communication and decision-making. 
The respective questionnaire (Appendix 2) sent to 50 recipients had a 75 per 
cent rate of return and the second set of questions asked through interviews as per the 
normal Delphi practice followed for the main TF exercise. Again, participants were 
members of the scientific community (academia, research organization consultancies 
and the industry). 
108 
9.2 Findings of the Survey 
Although the survey was limited, it has drawn many interesting observations. 
Being the first survey of this kind it establishes the beginning of a new requirement for 
generic and specific Aerospace and Defence technologies covering short, medium and 
long- term needs. 
The initial efforts of this work were the localization of Greek customers for 
HF research, what are their drivers and who are the end beneficiaries. Humans are an 
integral part of the socio-technical solutions provided and the 
platform/operator/maintainer level will incorporate HF requirements ensuring also that 
the appropriate relationships between seller, buyer and end-user are established 
(HF INAC, 2002). 
The main findings start from the fact that engineers working in the defence and 
aerospace companies do not fully accept the contribution of HF to the design. 
Additionally, they were not aware that there are specialist skills to answer the HF 
questions. Consequently, there is a lack of standards and processes for HF requirements 
in design and products. Therefore HF inclusion in conceptual design will require costs 
in order to receive economic benefits from undertaking HF issues and meeting 
international emerging legislation. If there was transfer of scientific and technological 
knowledge from the research to the industrial sector it could be of help in this case. 
One of the more interesting notes is the difficulty of recruiting experienced HF 
professionals and the lack of necessary skills is partially due to studies offered in 
universities programs (HELDIC Interview, 2003). Continuing professional development 
courses cannot do much to alleviate this situation. Nevertheless this shortage of high 
quality practitioners in HF, Applied Psychology or Ergonomics could be covered quite 
rapidly during the next eight years. Of course, not all of these people will be able to 
apply HF in design, engineering, manufacturing and other commercial enyironrnent. 
Among the interviewers there is a common understanding of the inter-personal 
cultural and social issues, which govern communication and decision making in multi-
cultural, multi-service and multi-national operations. This in tum means that the Greek 
109 
Armed Forces must function in an interoperable environment using systems confirming 
to HF integration. 
The use of unmanned and remotely operated vehicles in all environments will 
be growing. Mainstream society and mass media follow attitudes, values and behayiors, 
which directly influence the military forces, which in tum must be able to carry various 
mission types in a single operation (combat, humanitarian aid or peace keeping). Thus 
the wider socio-technical structures of systems require high standards of HF integration 
for a better human-systems effectiveness. 
9.3 Conclusions and Recommendations 
We propose that investments be made on the next five significant areas of high 
priority. 
1. The Design Process 
Human Factors Integration (HFI) approach must incorporate all human issues 
into the design of large, complex and distributed systems/projects/programmes as they 
are essential for safe and efficient operation. The development of processes and tools to 
support HFI ensures the avoidance of accidents and other needs for expensive remedial 
modifications or upgrades. 
Acceptable design standards will help overcome over-reliance on subjectivity 
and minimization of poor human-systems integration. Thus the associated commercial 
benefits include reduced cost of product development, lower life-cycle cost and better 
adaptation to current and emerging international standards as well as meeting of 
different occupational legislative frameworks (DTIIDAS, 2001). 
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2. Interface Technologies 
These are the interaction products (either hardware or software). which provide 
an interface between the human operator and all the other components of the 
system/equipment. 
The man-machine interface is achieved when three fundamental questions can 
be answered. The first pertains the kind of function the product performs, the second 
asks the expected use of it and the third wonders what is the optimal form of 
implementation of this application (peacetime/wartime, all-weather, 24-hour use and 
air-sea/land operation) (HF INAC, 2002). 
Some examples related to the Aerospace and Defence Technologies proposed 
for the 2020 are the next interaction technologies: operator displays and signals, 
synthetic environment (vision and data fusion), vehicle control handgrips input 
information management. 
3. Automation 
As more and more information is produced by processmg capability it is 
increasingly difficult for operators to process and deal with the quantity of information. 
Thus systems are becoming more automated because they must produce this 
information and they have to assist in handling a great amount of it. Sometimes 
automation is considered responsible for involvement in human errors causing incidents 
or accidents. So the requirement of utilizing automation in the most optimal way 
remains vital. 
The research has proved that almost 100 per cent of the interviewees consider 
human-automation interaction concepts in future Aerospace and Defence technologies a 
key factor in 
o Reducing workload 
o Supporting situational awareness 
o Better decision making 
o A voiding human errors 
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o Training and skills development 
o Creation of intelligent interfaces 
Here situational awareness is referred too, which remams critical because 
inaccurate or impoverished situational awareness could contribute to man-made errors 
and other failures. However, it is quite paradoxical to acknowledge a pressure in design 
for reducing operators skill level and manpower quality while we need to provide 
information synthesis for the optimum decision making. In paralleL the new design 
philosophy removes humans from direct control of systems but at the same time asks 
for deeper human involvement to track the automation. 
Finally, the development of pragmatic and genetic methods is indispensable for 
the effective design of HF in systems as well as the inclusion of tools for prediction and 
assessment of individual and team human factors integration. 
4. Human Error 
According to recent studies (Flight Safety Manual, 2002) human error IS 
recognized as a major problem - up to 80 per sent - in aerospace and defence 
applications resulting always in considerable financial costs. An understanding of 
human error process and then the application of correction strategies to system design 
should lead to an increase in both operational safety and efficiency. An analysis of data 
has shown that information technology is changing the type of operator and technician 
tasks, shifting them towards more cognitive (unobservable) rather than physical 
(observable) forms (HF INAC, 2002). Moreover teams are not able to predict human 
error adequately or early enough through the existing tools and techniques. 
Resolution of any of the issues associated with human errors will have a great 
impact of all types of defence and especially aerospace equipment design, production, 
maintenance, training and final operation. The research should be extended to various 
areas in order to provide information to the engineering community, which will produce 
functionality thus enabling the interface of error tolerant/resistive systems. Human 
process research will also be conveyed to systems designers together with the research 
of systems behaviour for incorporating error prevention and error recovery tools. In 
112 
general the final aim of all these types of research is directed at the design of new 
systems that could mitigate errors in new products areas. 
5. Life Cycle Considerations 
According to a recent NATO study (RTO/MP-059. 2001) the follow-on-
support cost of an advanced weapon system (aircraft, submarine, air defence battery) 
equals its acquisition cost after eight years of use and ownership. This follow-on-
support cost is made up of many factors such as logistic support requirements. 
maintenance tools, training of personnel, documentation upgrade, engineering change 
proposals, safety bulletins, stock control and supply chain management etc. 
The Hellenic Air Force has examined many cases of fighter or trainer aircraft 
(Mirage F1CG, F5A1B, T-33, T-37 etc.) after their phase out. Using these aircrafts for 
more than thirty years they were able to analyse collected data on all the previously 
mentioned activities and confirm the results of the study. This researcher - as the first 
aeronautical engineer trained in this technology - was involved in the case of Mirage 
F 1 CG fighter, which was removed from the active service in 2004 completing three 
decades of interception missions over the Aegean Sea. 
Interviewees with special expenence III reliability, availability and 
maintainability issues were insistent on the importance of human costs. The review of 
human factors over the whole life cycle context (from concept to disposal) can provide 
many benefits to the user e.g. reduction of human errors in maintenance, better 
efficiency with updated maintenance process, new training methods and a general use of 
human-centric support aids. 
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10 
COMPARISON WITH OTHER 
TECHNOLOGY FORESIGHT 
PROGRAMMES 
10.1 Scope 
Through this research 24 other national and regional Foresight programmes 
have been analysed (see Table 7). Being outside the scope of this study, not all of them 
could be compared with the Greek case. As the closest the French, the Italian, the 
Spanish and the Portuguese cases were chosen. There were various reasons such as 
similar culture, proximity of countries but mainly the same orientation of the five 
chosen studies, which is technological with an intensive participation of technology 
experts and a relatively limited consideration of socio-political interactions. These 
industry-led national Foresight exercises have been compared to each other using the 
criteria of how they were conducted and organized, what they have in common, what 
the relationships between results and the methods applied are and what lessons can be 
drawn for future studies. 
In spite of the broad variety of objectives, approaches, institutional design and 
methodologies the comparison of the five programmes have indicated some important 
common elements 
a. The studies assisted in the generation of increased awareness of the 
importance of forward thinking in the establishment of private and public 
science and technology strategies. 
b. All the TF programmes were launched with policy objecti\'es and their 
results have been directed into non-academic committees which ha\'e 
utilized them in various ways. 
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c. Although these projects started as one-off efforts, they found continuit:. 
in these five countries where new exercises (local or national) have been 
promised. Moreover the provisional organizational structures that have 
been prepared for supporting the studies tend to be turned into permanent 
situations. 
The policy orientation also varied from country to country. In the Iberian 
Peninsula, the Portuguese and Spanish approaches were inclined to the strategic and 
management dimensions of TF while France and Italy have paid more attention to 
linkages with science and development. Greece has followed a combination of these 
trends although the original question for the Aerospace and Defence Technologies 
Working Group was to point out specific domains for technological focus. 
The aim of this section of the research is not to attempt to carry out a 
benchmarking of the specific technology related aspects of the TF studies but to help to 
draw lessons on the advantages and disadvantages of the different approaches and 
methodologies followed by the separate initiatives. In addition, Greece was the only 
country, among the five examined, to have the preparation of a specific TF on 
Aerospace and Defence Technologies as an aim, thus no direct comparison can be made 
with the others' results. 
10.2 Motivation 
The Foresight processes in these countries were initiated by different actors 
going after different policy objectives and led by different incentives. Greece, Portugal 
and Italy were bottom-up but Spain and France were top-down efforts. 
o The Portuguese study (2000) started from concerns about national 
industrial competitiveness within the context of the European Union 
market making the optimum use of Science, Engineering and 
Technology. 
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o In Italy the first phase was funded by industry in order to examine how 
the science and technology policy could assist the industrial requirements 
(Roveda, 2000). 
o Spain, anxious about its industrial environment, has completed a three-
phased report, funded by Ministry of Science and Technology. for 
identifying emerging technologies and mobilizing accordingly the 
existing technical research centers (Molas-Gallart et aI, 2002). 
o The French TF exercise, completed in 2000 with funds from the Ministry 
of Industry, had as a principal aim the identification of the 100 key 
technologies. The future industrial competitiveness of France within the 
European Union and other continents - aligned with demands and needs 
- was the driver for this study (Seelinger and Lacomme, 2001). 
o Greece started its TF study in 2001 and finished March 2005 co-financed 
by European Union and General Secretariat of Research and Technology 
which belongs to the Ministry of Development. Based on the hypothesis 
that Science, Technology and Innovation drive the economic and social 
development, the Greek TF established a frame work of guidelines for 
planning the strategies of the public and private sectors. 
The involvement of state in the TF exercises was quite variable too. Greece and 
France, for instance, issued a public bid through the Ministry of Industrial Development 
and involved in the programme management universities, private consultants, 
ministerial departments, public research centers and other private actors. In Italy, the 
linkage between TF and public policy was created after the private initiative started the 
programme and the first results were in hand. 
10.3 Methodologies Used 
The common characteristic of all five TF cases is the development of a 
networking mentality supported by the central work of experts panel groups and 
coordinated by a steering committee. However. important differences remain in the 
technologies used. 
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The French and Greek studies are technology-oriented comparing the 
attractiveness of various technologies. Nevertheless, Greece implied the development of 
alternative scenarios (global and specific) while France developed eight thematic sub-
groups plus an "Interaction and Quality" working group examining the perspectives of 
demand and the interactions between technologies and sectors (Zappacosta et aI, 2002). 
The Italian case was structurally more similar with the French approach but 
they did not intend to identify 100 or so key technologies. Instead, under the leadership 
of well recognised authorities in every field, the allocated experts panels were asked to 
assess technologies and justify their choice according to two sets of indicators analysing 
their attractiveness and feasibility. 
The Portuguese resembled partly to the Greek approach and built an analysis of 
major scenarios describing alternative European future situation. Therefore according to 
these scenarios and the foreseeable exelixis of markets they have chosen the appropriate 
technologies fitted to the country. The target here was not to define a list of 
technologies but a socio-political macro-scenario to frame a vision of the future through 
which the technology aspects could be derived. 
Spain has used mixed techniques (Delphi, surveys, experts panels, scenarios) 
under the auspices of eight independent research centers, which processed the surveys 
covering corresponding sectors of the whole study. 
The final conclusion is that the Spanish study lies in-between the 
technologically oriented French and Italian approaches while Greece, besides the 
similarities with the previous exercises, disposes institutional and policy elements of the 
Portuguese effort, which in any case is different from the other TF programmes. 
10.4 Results and Impacts 
Greece and France prepared their open-ended TF exercises because they aimed 
to help creating the framework of future thinking and to design national strategies. The 
outcome would be a kind of a technology map playing a significant role as an a\\arencss 
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and communications tool supporting any future decision on the allocation of resources 
across research projects. The limited funds, especially for Greece, imposed a rapid 
implementation of such a synthetic information instrument. Yet, IF for Greece is mor~ 
suitable for strategic decision making since it is more long-term than the French one and 
also focuses on technological discontinuities or the possibility on any technological or 
economic rupture. Another more important common objective of both studies is that 
everyone (business units, organisations, researchers etc.) has access and can use the 
results according to each own purposes. 
The next two technology-oriented South-European cases, the Spanish and the 
Italian, differ in the sense that the first is addressed to decision makers in private and 
public sectors while the second provides a better information pattern to the community 
of scientists and the technologists. 
The fifth initiative, the Portuguese Foresight. tries to connect research and 
innovation improving critical institutional arrangements as it is targeted to political 
people and high-level private managers. 
Different strategies too have been followed for the diffusion of the TF findings. 
Greece as the youngest member of TF Club does not expect the study report 
to become a best seller and disseminated the results through the Internet 
without paying much attention to the elaboration of this document. 
Similarly, Portugal prepared their work, which was handled by an 
independent non-profit Observatory in order to give continuity to the 
presentation of results. 
Spain has organised an international conference through their own 
Observatory, which has published the reports in an electronic format. 
Afterwards, during the last six years they execute follow-ups yia a quarterly 
news bulletin and a number of national and regional workshops 
_ Italy went further by printing the results of their study in a book form. \\"hich 
is widely sold in bookstands. Moreover, a national conference gave the 
opportunity to governmental officials and private stakeholders to be 
informed about the TF proposals. 
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Finally France, after any succeSSIve TF efforts, has published the key 
technologies, which are presented in specific formats including fields of 
application and the competitive position of French and European products 
and services. 
The impact in all Foresights are mostly the same because, apart from the 
specific technical results and policy recommendations, the outcomes of the process 
itself are equally useful for every stakeholder at all levels. Across different societal 
groups there were significant benefits from the whole procedure of vast information 
exchange, opened communication avenues, strong networking activity and even policy 
debates among members of the involved teams. 
Japan Romania 
United Kingdom Bulgaria 
Germany Austria 
France Czech Republic 
Italy Hungary 
Spain South Africa 
Portugal New Zealand 
USA Netherlands 
Australia Sweden 
Greece South Korea 
China Cyprus 
Thailand Canada 
Denmark Finland 
Russia Ukraine 
Table 7. Countries, which have conducted Technology Foresight studies. 
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10.5 Pan - European Aim 
This companson could lead to a common ED approach for Foresight. 
Therefore within the Frame Programme 6 (FP6) ED will initiate wide approaches on 
European issues which are based on monitoring Foresight data from various member 
states. The target is to develop mutual learning between member and associated states 
and regions. 
Some questions concerning the shape of Foresight (Universities, Industries. 
research institutions, policy makers, international organizations and associations etc.) in 
Frame Programme 7 (FP7) were posed to target groups and the replies favored 
Foresight initiatives along the six major objectives of FP7 (Table 9). All stakeholders 
agrees that TF provides a means of contributing to the conception, strategy and socio-
economic contextualization of actions related to FP7. In paralleL it allows disseminated 
activities (appropriate and suitable) according to the pre-defined issues in order to 
ensure the right implementation. The provision of a homogeneous pool of experts 
through TF for each of these EU objectives is also a decisive factor. Thus the allocation 
of more than 100 mi Euro is programmed to cover future TF exercises in the EU. 
• Creating European Centres of Excellence through collaboration between 
laboratories 
• Launching European technological initiatives 
• Stimulating the creativity of basic research through competition between 
teams at European level 
• Developing research infrastructure of European interest 
• Improving the coordination of national research programmes 
Table 8. The major objectives of EU research activities (Brichard, 2005). 
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11 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
11.1 Organizing Interaction 
During the Greek TF exercise I had three responsibilities in the Aerospace and 
Defence Technologies team. One was that of Chairman of the whole sector. the second 
was to be the Rapporteur for the Sub-group of the Technology Scientists (Appendix 3) 
and the third was to act as a researcher to probe further into some areas such as 3rd 
round of Delphi (Chapter 3.2.4), dual-use technologies (Chapter 8), Human Factors 
Interaction (Chapter 9) and technologies with wide applications (Chapter 5.5.2) 
including new materials (Chapter 7.8). 
such as: 
The initial responsibility as a Chairman was to manage the team with tasks 
• Leading the project and organizing the multitude of involved participants 
in WGand SG 
• Supervising the varIOUS narrower or wider concentric circles of 
participants which constitute a structured pattern of more than 300 
individuals so far 
• Keeping regular contacts with the stakeholders and the Steering 
Committee to maintain proper direction and time scale 
• 
• 
Ensuring integration in workshops, conferences, journals etc. 
Controlling the project alignment with original technical objecti\es and 
its relevance to broader activities and policies 
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As a Rapporteur I contributed to the experts' work which was more often not 
organized around panels and WG. This work consisted of 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Collecting all relevant information and knowledge 
Promoting new insights, creative views and strategies as well as ne\\ 
networks 
Disseminating the TF process and results to broader audiences 
Preparing follow-up actions 
Because of our late entrance into the TF process there was no chance to pass 
through a pre-foresight stage. Thus no awareness seminars were held across the country 
to promote TF among experts and professionals. It was the personal influence of the 
researcher who exercised his 37 -year involvement in the Aerospace and Defence 
environment of Greece to invite and convince key people who were both visionary and 
actively involved in the field to enlist in this campaign. Some of them, well-known 
figures as "champions and ambassadors" through their early enlistment put forward the 
arguments for Technology Foresight. 
However ,in the widespread participation of players we have dared to apply to 
a very limited extent a casual approach which was sometimes occasional and episodic. 
Thus the legitimacy of the activity was strengthened and any required specific 
knowledge inputs were inserted. The active involvement of the various stakeholders 
from the beginning of the TF until the end of the activity was given much emphasis. 
The reason is that this is a core factor differentiating Foresight from other narrow 
futures and planning approaches. 
In any case members of the various groups were selected carefully. The risk of 
creating an utopian "wish - list" of personalities was avoided but instead open-minded 
and creative individuals have been located who collectively had knowledge coyering a 
wide range of the Aerospace and Defence topics under consideration and not strictly 
specialists. These participants were directed to share knowledge, to speak and relate to 
each other as experts and not as their own interest group representatiyes. [\,1any times 
leadership and conflict management skills were required to maintain motivation and 
morale, to resolve disagreements by stimulating team-building as well as formation of 
new network and revitalization of established ones. An important correction was made 
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in the later phase of the programme when it was perceived that too much autonomy 
started creating difficulties for synthesis of WG outputs and agreement on shared 
priorities. 
It must be underlined here that in order to keep the willingness to participate 
high a balance had to be created between sophisticated and demanding methods leadin~ 
to technological rigour and availability of group members. Respecting their time, busy 
researchers and business people who found it difficult even to attend all the WG. SG or 
other panel meetings could not be pressed. So it might be hard to persuade them to 
attend yet more meetings to learn certain modem methods without any incentive but the 
satisfaction of participation in TF framework prerogative and authority were absolutely 
vital for the stakeholders' representatives because TF activities must carry a stamp of 
approval to assure all participants that they are engaged in a worthy endeavour (Keenan 
and Miles, 2002). In this case, this was ascertained from the first contact with these 
people. 
Apart from the proper reaction of participants, project management required 
the use of simple tools for monitoring. This consisted of continuously observing the 
activities undertaken during the implementation of each step in order to compare them 
against the targets. Similarly, the project play needed to be adopted to its environment 
because a TF exercise is expected to be flexible. Initially, it was thought to apply 
Project Evaluation Review Technique (PERT) management framework to follow the 
project milestones but unfortunately time constraints discouraged this effort. 
Even though Greek TF in Aerospace and Defence could be characterized as a 
kind of navigation between the analysis of the approaches and an action-oriented 
programme the successful aim was to set up a combined process-based and a product-
based activity, as it will be explained at the last paragraph of this sub-chapter. 
Finally, the codified knowledge which pertains to all typical formal outputs 
was a considerable amount of work which had to be realized by using many of our o\\n 
means (secretarial/technical assistance and accommodation). Informal outputs are more 
difficult to group since they take the form of knowledge integrated in people' s practices 
and approaches to tackle problems. This is the main concern at present and reasonable 
benefits from the development of new network together with the parallel integration of 
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TF results and methods into the strategy and the projects of organizations and user 
groups (e.d. companies, trade unions, government agencies etc.) are needed. 
This had to do with the previously mentioned process-oriented approach of the 
TF in Aerospace and Defence. One focus was on achieving better networking and 
exchanges of opinions between participants enabling carriers of relevant knowledge to 
share understanding about each other's expectations and pursue strategies \vhile forging 
an evolving network for collaboration. The second focus was oriented toward achieving 
tangible outputs such as key technologies and critical list of priorities. This is the so-
called product-oriented approach and was the main objective set by sponsor of TF. the 
General Secretariat of Research and Technology. The above mentioned may seem as 
dissimilar foci but indeed they constitute a synthesized output of the TF. 
11.2 Concluding Remarks 
Greek TF was the first integrated Foresight effort in our country and it is of 
course too soon to draw any conclusions about the effectiveness of the new programme. 
The size of Greece and the level of economic and social development played a decisive 
role in setting the objectives ofTF in Aerospace and Defence Technologies. 
As this TF did not start with a well-defined and rigid methodological blueprint, 
the major decisions were taken jointly by the participants, permitting some important 
details on methodology to evolve throughout the whole process. Several times when 
WG members were faced with various tasks the original objectives had to be rethought 
by not letting them to reach ambitious levels (given also the set timeframe) but to be 
adjusted to the Greek context. 
The first step of TF was technology mapping to outline the playing field and to 
define and explain the content and concepts of the problem to be analysed. Mapping 
provides a platform for discussion and supports the foci of TF study. For this project the 
mapping task was not straightforward since there was a vast area of ditTerent 
technologies and sometimes the risk was faced of confusion. frustration and contlict in 
the subsequent part of the process. Fortunately. three members of the \\'G acted as 
qualified facilitators and created problem-solving interventions. 
The adaptation of the scenarios method to WG conditions was imposed by the 
difficulties encountered during the applications of this technique. People could not 
easily understand the difference between planning and thinking about qualitatively 
dissimilar futures in order to formulate a vision building. Nobody had the opportunity to 
get involved in actual scenario-design exercises before, so TF remained a participative. 
continuous learning process from a methodological point of view which apart from 
advantages created inevitable drawbacks. Moreover this lack of advance planning 
increased the commitments from the participants and maybe deprived the final report 
from a well-presented format of results. 
Since TF IS a predominantly dynamic and learning process our 
recommendation is that some objectives must be reconsidered along with the evolution 
of some aspects of TF methodology. This is enhanced by the fact that Foresight stays a 
costly project in terms of money and the time devoted by participants, especially for 
Greece which is a small country with limited resources that is not found at the forefront 
of technological development but rather at the semi-periphery. Thus, our experts do not 
demonstrate much experience in leading-edge technologies, nor they have readily 
available previous TF products which could be obtained only through such national 
programmes. Analysis of real Foresight studies indicates that TF is an art as much as a 
science. Of course it is essential to evaluate previous studies and to learn from 
experience to maximize opportunities for success. However, a critique executed in the 
post-foresight stage showed that even the most careful planning cannot determine 
exactly what will happen during the project thus organized which must be open to 
chances for increasing authority, legitimacy and credibility as the study processes. It 
follows that the best way of learning about TF is to do it, because it is only the tacit 
knowledge built through experience and the willingness to seize opportunities during 
the study can make the difference between substantial or minor impact. \\' e are 
convinced that the unique benefit of Greek TF could enhance our international 
competitiveness and position in the global context opposite to major trends through the 
analysis of domestic strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (S\\'OT). 
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Technology Foresight not only requires technology insight but also the ability 
to choose the right set of methods and tools for firms and research institutes to make 
valid decisions for the future research and development of Aerospace and Def~nc~ 
Technologies. Hence TF was a clear success in attracting widespread support in 
industry, much of the science base and the governmental officials. However the rushed 
timescale inhibited the complete development of mature recommendations and th~ 
ability to get full advantage of methodologies. The panel in Aerospace and Defence 
mostly worked well and no significant barriers of communication emerged between 
members or among the other panels. The next phase of TF is proposed to have a more 
cross-sectoral approach and more permeable walls. 
As proposed in the Programme Planning and Rationale/Module DPS 4521 
(Tsolakidis, 2002) the project attempted to take forward the wider roles of all 
professional areas involved (government, companies and academia) and to enhance 
professionalism of public servants. Human resources management will be also able to 
keep in country high-quality individuals because of favorable employment conditions. 
Similarly professional approach in key domains such as standardization, dual-use 
products, intra-community transfers will permit better monitoring of defence and 
aerospace industries ensuring competitivity and effective use of national resources. The 
innovation proposed in the TF promises a genuinely creative approach to the future set 
by the vision of 2020 together with the changes in the structure for military research 
institutes and procurement law. We estimate that the new cycle of TF will have a real 
opportunity to capture the public imagination and foster a "Foresight culture" because 
this TF programme - even though has represented a step change in the members 
consulted about priorities - it is still very largely confined to a technical extent. As in 
the UK (Georghiou and Keenan, 2000), here too in some senses this first TF cycle can 
be seen as a "heroic era" in which the successes were achieved through the driving force 
of key individuals championing particular activities. In any case the expected excessive 
focus on technology as a driver led to over-emphasis on technical fix solutions relative 
to regulatory or social change in spite of the contribution of two sub-groups of Political 
Scientists and Defence Economics. 
Almost in the middle of TF process national elections brought the opposition 
into power and the new government exercises strong criticism of preliminary reports 
because politicians always try to establish their o\\~n ne\\ policies by modifying 
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perspectives as they have a shorter time horizon. According to our explicated opinion it 
must be acknowledged that Foresight cannot solve all the social. economic or political 
problems that beset a state. Foresight can generate visions. Ideally, a large amount of 
these will be shared visions and ones that are well-founded on the knowledge of 
relevant developments in social or technological affairs (Miles. 2002). But if TF is 
neither a "quick fix" nor a "magic wand" to impose a consensus in situation where there 
are profound disagreements, then political discretion needs to be exercised in cases 
where conflict is inevitable between sectors on highly contentious issues. Also TF has 
provided the information (e.g. a priority list) needed for a particular policy to be 
implemented. Governance should act and implement the generated outputs otherwise 
the involved people will feel that their expectations have been raised unduly and their 
time wasted. Without any doubt the sort of longer-term analyses that TF involves and 
the new networks and capabilities that it can forge cannot be expected to achie\'e results 
overnight. Often the processes of interacting ideas and seized opportunities in parallel 
with confronted challenges will take a long time to conclude in widely accepted motions 
in the way forward. To prepare people for the significant change requires long 
preparation and considerable groundwork. 
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APPENDIX 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE I 
(Used for Delphi Method and Interview) 
1 What areas of innovation are expected to offer significant advances during the next 
20 years? 
2 What are the success perspectives connected to these areas? 
3 What is the impact of the previously mentioned significant advances on general 
economic development? 
4 What is the expected special impact on work and employment? 
5 Can this technological innovation assist in the solution of environmental issues? 
6 What is the effect of innovation advances in the development of society? 
7 Which are the main results of R&D, that will contribute the greatest improvement 
in human knowledge? 
8 What is the time frame for the successful realization of these individual areas? 
9 Which countries can be considered as leaders in the various R&D areas? 
10 Which are the required steps in order Greece to be able to synchronize or even to 
be a leader in these areas of R&D? How can this be translated practically? 
11 What possible benefit can arise after the realization and utilization of these 
technological innovations especially in the domain of disposing the resulting 
products? 
12 What is the innovation potential (1 to 5)? 
13 What is the timescale for research, development and application? 
14 How can anyone show that there is a proper balance between basic and applied 
research in Aerospace and Defence technologies? How does this imply for the 
distribution of funds across disciplines? 
15 What will be the cost of carrying out the strategic research and subsequent 
development needed before Greece can exploit the economic or social benefits of 
the particular technology? 
16 Who are the players in the field of TF? 
17 What are the key issues they have been working on? 
18 What are the projects they are occupied presently? 
19 Why are these issues of prime importance for eyery particular player': 
U9 
20 Which methods do they use to get the answers that policy makers and the political 
administration need? 
21 What kind of measures IS taken to implement the results? How IS the 
implementation process organized? 
22 How do you rate (1 to 5) the policy impact of TF on areas of technology or 
innovation? Which is their importance (l to 5) to market success? 
23 Can you suggest another key priorities in relation to science and technology 
investments? 
24 How could you classify these priorities to their importance (benefits to Greece and 
ability to harness benefits) and feasibility? 
25 What role should national policy play in coordinating organizations? 
26 How in conditions of uncertainty can some sense of direction and priority be given 
to research agendas? 
27 What is the need to make decisions today for close future alternatives? 
28 Who should be involved in deriving future scenarios? 
29 How do funding decisions today be affected by expectations of the future, a future 
acknowledged as uncertain and yet "creatable"? 
30 Which are your main fields of expertise? 
31 Can you indicate the ratio of work done for public services to work done for 
private clients? 
32 Do you wish to mention some of your clients? 
33 List the co-operations and networks that you participate. 
34 What human resources and skills will be required? 
35 What market and technology opportunities are likely to arise? 
36 Which of these will be best placed to adopt in Greece? 
37 How Greece should organize itself to take the greatest advantage of the 
opportunities? 
38 Who should take action? 
39 What is the Greek Aerospace and Defence export potential (1 to 5)? 
40 What is the civil market potential (l to 5)? 
41 Are Greek production capabilities commercially viable on domestic market (1 to 
5)? 
42 How high are the barriers to entry (1 to 5)? 
43 Can Greek Aerospace and Defence industry succeed? 
140 
44 What is Greece's current position in Aerospace and Defence development versus 
advanced European Countries Concerning: S&T capabilities. exploitation of R&D 
results, quality of production or service and efficacy of regulation (options ranging 
from '"unacceptable" "lower leveL but acceptable", "fairly similar" to "higher 
level")? 
45 What is Greece's current position versus the rest of the world? (same as above) 
46 Are there any constraints: social/ethical, technical, commercial, economic. lack of 
funding, regulatory standards, education/skill base? (yes or no) 
47 Can you rank the relevance of the three policy tools - domestic R&D, purchase of 
licence, know-how or ready-made products - in promotion of development and 
application? 
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APPENDIX 2 
QUESTIONNAIRE II 
(Used for Human Factors Integration) 
1. What is the contribution of Human Factors in design of Defence and Aerospace 
systems? 
2. Can you name some key areas which are directly influenced by human-automation 
interaction concepts? 
3. Do you employ any Human Factors specialists? (Yes or No) 
4. If yes, how many? 
5. Have you had any difficulty to recruit suitable Human Factors staff? (Yes or No) 
6. If no, was it easy to retain these professionals during the last 3 years? (Yes or No) 
7. If the answer is negative, has any employee left the organisation as a result of 
difficulties in career progression within the Human Factors profession? 
8. Specific skills, knowledge or abilities from Human Factors specialists are required 
by most organisations. Which methods do you employ to develop the Human 
Factors training of your staff? 
9. According to your perspectives which is the short-term priority in the initial and 
continuing education/training of Human Factors professionals for Greek Defence 
and Aerospace industries? 
10. Can you suggest correspondingly the most important longer-term priority? 
I·Q 
APPENDIX 3 
AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE TECHNOLOGIES 
WORKING GROUP 
Chairman 
Stefanos Tsolakidis, President, KLEOS S.A. 
Coordinators 
Daglas Vassilis, Researcher Nat. School of Public Health 
Karabekios Nick, Researcher, University of Athens 
Sub-group of Political Scientists 
Rapporteur: Dokos Athanasios, Research Director of ELIAMEP 
• Eliadis Theodoros, Consultant, Ministry of Education 
• Kintis Andreas, Analyst, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
• Protonotarios Nick, Analyst, Ministry of Defence 
Sub-group of Defence Economists 
Rapporteur: Kollias Christos, Professor of TEL Larissa 
• Rafaelidis Apostolos, Lecturer of TEl, Patras 
• Nikolaidou Eftichia, Lecturer of City Lib. Studies 
• Moschovis George, Consultant DESMI S.A. 
Sub-group of Technology Scientists 
Rapporteur: Stefanos Tsolakidis, President KLEOS S.A. 
• Douris Christos, Alternate Director, Hellenic Anns Industry 
• Evangelou Panos, Director, Hellenic Aerospace Industry 
• Miropoulos Nikitas, Major General HAF, Director MoD 
• Giannopoulos George, Brig. General HA, Offsets Director MoD 
• Goulios George, Director, Hellenic Shipyards 
• Moulias Nick, President Association of Defence Industry 
• Panayiotakis Kostas, Lt. GeneraL Hellenic Anny Chief 
l··U 
• Vekinis George, Researcher DEMOKRITUS 
• Kantas Antonis, Professor, University of Thessaloniki 
• Yfantis Vassilis, Colonel, HAF General Staff 
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AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE TECHNOLOGIES 
SUPPORT GROUP 
• Sarlis Makis, General Manager, ISOTRON S.A 
• Theofilou MichaeL Colonel HAF, MoD/GDA 
• Papadoudis Costas, Vice President, KLEOS S.A. 
• Tsakonas Panagiotis, Analyst, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
• Groppa Rouby, Consultant ELIAMEP 
• Arkoumaneas Elias, President, SONAK S.A. 
• Botsaris Akis, Professor University of Patras and SMA 
• Tsitinidis Triant, President of Aeronautical Engineers 
• Kepidis George, President ANTOSIS S.A. 
• Troullinos George, General Manager INTRAKOM 
• Koutsos Kostas, President MIL TECH S.A. 
• Polymenopoulos Alex, Dep.Director of R&T MoD 
• Laios Vassilis, Lecturer, University of City, London 
• Kantzis Alex, President of MICRON 
• Kounnamas Gregory, Naval Engineer, Hellenic Shipyards 
• Kostopoulos Vassilis, Alter. Professor, University of Patras 
• Pintelas George, Director, Hellenic Defence Systems 
• Angelidis Emmanuel, Director of Hellenic Navy Research Center 
• Tsausopoulos Theodoros, Director of Hellenic Army Research Center 
• Siannas Christos, Colonel, Dep. Commander of Hellenic Air Force Research 
Center 
• Ladis Lakis, Director, Electronics Dpt Director, HAl 
• Chrissos George, President ELFON Ltd 
• Economidis Takis, ex-Chairman of ECON S.A. 
• Niarchos Nick, Research Director of DEMOKRITUS 
• Grivas Kostas, Consultant, Institute of Defence Analyses 
• Ioannidis George, Admiral (Rtd) ex-chief of Hellenic Navy 
• Katsimitros Nick, Director, THEON S.A. 
• Romanos Loukas, President, THALES S.A. 
1-+5 
• Panaras Argyris, Colonel (Rtd) HAF. Researcher NASAlNTLJ A 
• Frangakos Antonis, Maj General HAF. C'Branch Director 
• Liousis Nick, Consultant 1ST AME 
• Pissinou Georgia, R&D Director, HAl 
• Spathopoulos Theodoros, EU Programs Researcher. HAl 
• Tenekoudis Sakis, GDDIR General Director. MoD 
• Buvry Stephane, Technical Director of TES 
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APPENDIX 5 
RESEARCH PROJECTS COFINANCED BY GENERAL 
DIRECTORATE OF DEFENCE INDUSTRY AND RESEARCH 
Projects Description 
1. Aero engines Test Stand Upgrading 
2. Electronic Fuze for Ammunition and Bombs 
3. Digital Voice / Data Transmission 
4. Electronic Warfare Systems (Jammers and RWR) 
5. Long Range Ammo 
6. Batteries Multi charger 
7. Digital Satellite Data 
8. Radar Signature Supression 
9. Environmental Impact for Military Activities 
10. Mobile Fuel Cells 
11. Surface to Air Missile Operation Center 
12. Simulation Technologies 
13. Chemical Warfare Agent Detectors 
14. Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle 
15. Virtual Cockpit Demonstrator 
16. Logistic System Development 
17. Passive Radar Development 
18. Passive Detection for Submarines 
19. Development of Various Ammunition 
20. Frequency Hopping Radios 
21. High Speed Communications Network 
22. Small-sized Submarine 
23. Industrial Upgrading of state-owned defence companies 
24. Virtual Aeroturbines Lab 
25. Hull design for fast patrol boats 
26. Crypto systems design 
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SOME DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGIES DEVELOPED BY GREEK 
AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE INDUSTRIES 
Company 
Hellenic Aerospace 
Industry 
Hellenic Defence Systems 
(Hellenic Arms Industry / 
Hellenic Ammunition 
Industry) 
Intracom 
ELFON 
MILTECH 
Hellenic Shipyards 
Hellenic Vehicles Industry 
Thales Electronic Systems 
Soukos Robots 
Sunlight 
Technologies / Products 
- Aircraft and Helicopter Maintenance 
- Turbines for aeolic energy generators 
- Training services to civil customers 
- Desalination equipment 
- Composite materials processing 
- CAD/CAM products 
- Chemical treatment of metals 
- Ammunition for hunters 
- Hunting rifles 
- Uniforms and boots 
- Aircraft fuel tanks 
- Boxes for sensitive equipment transportation 
- CAD/CAM techniques 
- Communication Systems 
- Crypto technology 
- Wiring harnesses 
- Global Positioning Systems 
- Field telephones 
- Battery chargers 
- Merchant marine maintenance 
- Railways wagons 
- Cars and jeep vehicles 
- Printed Circuit Boards 
- Air traffic control equipment 
- Anti-terrorist robotic technology 
- Batteries for ci\'il and military application 
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APPENDIX 7 
ADC: 
ASIC: 
ATM: 
C2I: 
C3I: 
C4ISR: 
CFSP: 
CoTS: 
DEW: 
DID: 
EDA: 
EMP: 
EMU: 
ERA: 
ESDP: 
ETAN: 
EU: 
EUA: 
FOREN: 
GDDIR: 
GSRT: 
HA: 
HAF: 
HAl: 
HDS: 
HELDIC: 
HF: 
HFI: 
HN: 
ABBREVIATIONS 
Analog to Digital Converters 
Application Specific Integration Circuits 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode 
Command, Control, Intelligence 
Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence 
Command, Control, Communication, Computing, Intelligence. 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Commercial of the Shelf 
Directed Energy Weapons 
Defence Industry Directorate 
European Defence Agency 
Electromagnetic Pulse 
European Monetary Unification 
European Research Era 
European Security and Defence Policy 
European Technology Assessment Network 
European Union 
Economic University of Athens 
Foresight Regional Network 
General Directorate of Defence and Industrial Research 
General Secretarial of Research and Technology 
Hellenic Army 
Hellenic Air Force 
Hellenic Aerospace Industry 
Hellenic Defence Systems 
Hellenic Defence Industries Catalog 
High Frequency 
Human Factors Integration 
Hellenic Navy 
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HPM: 
HR: 
ICT: 
IPTS: 
ISDN: 
ISO: 
IT: 
JMAP: 
LF: 
LoS: 
MMIC: 
MoD: 
MoE: 
NATO: 
NIS: 
NSPH: 
NTUA: 
OB: 
R&D: 
R&T: 
RIS: 
RTD: 
S&T: 
SME: 
STRATA: 
SWOT: 
TF: 
UAV: 
UHF: 
UK: 
USA: 
USV: 
UUV: 
VHF: 
WEAG: 
High Power Microwaves 
Human Resources 
Information and Communication Technology 
Institute for Prospective Technology Studies 
Integrated Services Digital Network 
International Standards Organisation 
Information Technology 
Joint Medium Term Armament Programme 
Low Frequency 
Line of Sight 
Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuits 
Ministry of Defence 
Ministry of Economy 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
National Innovation System 
National School of Public Health 
National Technical University of Athens 
Offsets Benefits 
Research and Development 
Research and Technology 
Regional Innovation System 
Research and Technological Development 
Science and Technology 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
Strategic Analysis of Specific Political Issues 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
Technology Foresight 
Unmanned Airborne Vehicles 
Ultra High Frequency 
United Kingdom 
United States of America 
Unmanned Surface Vehicles 
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles 
Very High Frequency 
Western European Armament Group 
1':;0 
WEAO: 
WEU: 
WG: 
Western European Armament Organisation 
Western European Union 
Working Group 
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